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This thesis consists of three essays on the use of economic instruments in envi-
ronmental policy. The first essay analyses the case for interstate cooperation in
environmental taxation while the second and the third essays study questions
specific to the use of economic instruments in climate change mitigation.
The first essay analyses the incentives of national governments to cooper-
ate in regulating pollutants that spill over jurisdictional boundaries. A well-
established result within the literature that assumes perfect competition is
that a country, which is small in the sense that it cannot affect world prices,
has no incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental regu-
lation. By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988)
it is shown that this result does not hold for pollutants that have regional or
global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2)
have.
The second essay demonstrates a methodology for analysing the progress
and failure of projects in the CDM. It models the hazard of first issuance.
Integrated over duration, the hazard of first issuance gives the time to market,
defined as the duration between the start of the Global Stakeholder Process
and the first issuance of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). It is shown
that 50% of all projects which have started the Global Stakeholder Process fail
to issue CERs, while the remainder has a median time to market of 4 years.
The third essay illustrates a paradox in which overlapping climate policy
instruments may have the unintended consequence of accelerating rather than
decelerating global warming. The insight follows from a dynamic model, where
a quota obligation for power generated from renewables is introduced alongside
a carbon budget. A dynamic model allows to study how the schedule at
which the carbon budget is exhausted is affected by the quota obligation. The
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Since the industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, environmental
externalities have increased in prevalence, scale and scope. An environmental
externality occurs when the actions of one individual affects the state of the
environment, through a process which other individuals have no control over,
but which affects their welfare.
The scope of the environmental externalities vary. While some externalities
are very local, affecting only a handful people, such as the contamination of
neighbouring lakes by Talvivaara nickel mine in northern Finland, others, such
as the pollution of 80 per cent of shallow groundwaters in China to the extent
of not being safe for human consumption, affects the livelihoods of hundreds
of millions of individuals (Asian Development Bank, 2016; Talvivaara Mining
Company, 2014). Climate change is an example of an externality with a global
reach. A tonne of carbon dioxide released from Europe has the same effect as
a tonne of carbon dioxide released from China. While the effects of climate
change are not dependent on the source, the effects are not the same across
regions. Some regions are expected to be affected more severely than others
(Krusell & Smith, 2015).
Regulation of environmental externalities is a collective action problem. Cur-
rently, the main international forum for collective action on climate change
mitigation is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). Under the UNFCCC, two legal treaties co-exist, the Kyoto Proto-
col and the Paris Agreement. Publication I analyses the incentives for national
governments to cooperate in regulating pollutants that spill over jurisdictional
boundaries.
Traditionally, environmental externalities have been regulated by command-
and-control policies, that is, standards that explicitly state the legally accepted
range of environmental impairment by the regulated entities, with little or no
flexibility. Gradually, since the 1970s, economic instruments have emerged
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alongside, and in some cases replacing existing command-and-control policies.
Economic instruments are defined here as policy instruments that leave some
discretion for the regulated agents, typically but necessarily by establishing a
market and a price for the externality or the activity that causes it. The idea
of taxing the externality dates back to Pigou (1952). However, at the time
of Arthur Pigou, it was not viewed as a practical approach for controlling
pollution (Andersen, 1995).
The primary motivation for the use of economic instrument is efficiency. Ef-
ficiency is a difficult concept because of its many definitions. Pareto efficiency
requires that marginal damage costs are set equal to marginal control costs
(Adar & Griffin, 1976). However, for the regulation of most environmental
externalities, Pareto efficiency is a naive objective, because both damage costs
and control cost are typically unknown to the regulator. The emitters pre-
sumably know the control costs, but not the regulator. In most applications,
the best the regulator can hope for is to realise a certain level of abatement,
or environmental improvement, for the least cost. The least cost allocation is
attained by the equalisation of marginal control costs across emitters through
the establishment of a price on emissions. A price can established either
though a tax, a subsidy or by allocating a fixed amount of tradable pollution
allowances. With limited information, the level of abatement is a political
decision. Moreover, with a tax or subsidy, the size of the abatement is not
known ex-ante because the regulator does not know the control costs.
Emissions trading is a fairly new type of policy instrument, with the first
applications in the US, as part of the Clear Air Act of 1977 and its amendment
of 1990 (Hansjürgens, 2005). The appeal of emissions trading vis-à-vis taxes
can be explained by the perceived flexibility of emissions trading, which allows
heterogeneous economies, such as the EU Member States and, say, China to
join a common scheme. The political realism in many parts of the world,
including the EU, is that agreeing on emissions quotas is realistic whereas
agreeing on uniform CO2 taxes is not.
Current emissions trading schemes rely on one of two principles: cap-and-
trade or baseline-and-credit. A cap-and-trade scheme puts a cap on emissions
from included sectors and allows regulated entities to buy and sell emissions
allowances. Initially, the allowances are either auctioned or distributed for
free. The initial allocation has distributional effects but no effect on the equi-
librium. In a baseline-and-credit scheme, credits are issued ex-post, based on
the difference between monitored emissions and the baseline. The baseline is
the counterfactual, the emissions in the business as usual case.
14
Introduction
The leading examples of both types of schemes can be found within climate
policy, which by design is a collective action problem. The EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the leading example of a cap-and-trade scheme,
whereas the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), of the Kyoto protocol, is
the leading example of a baseline-and-credit scheme. The EU ETS started of
with a pilot phase in 2005-2007, and has since then expanded both in terms
of its geographical coverage, sectoral coverage and gas coverage (Bragadóttir,
Magnusson, Seppänen, & Sundén, 2016). Currently, The EU ETS covers ap-
proximately 42% of EU-28 emissions through a cap on emissions from large
stationary sources and emissions from air traffic within the trading area (Euro-
pean Environment Agency, 2016). The cap is defined in terms of EU Emissions
Allowances (EUAs), each of which give the right to emit one tonne of carbon
dioxide equivalents (tCO2e).
The CDM is one of three flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol.
Through the CDM, Annex I countries can meet part of their obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol by reducing emissions in non-Annex I countries. Somewhat
simplified, Annex I countries are developed countries, non-Annex I countries
are developing countries. The rationale for the CDM is that the cost of re-
ducing emissions in developing countries is, presumably, lower than the cost
of reducing emissions in developed countries. Of past and current emissions
trading schemes, no other scheme comes even close to the CDM, measured in
terms of geographical coverage (117 host countries) sectoral coverage (energy,
transport, agriculture, afforestation, reforestation, fugitive emissions, landfill
gases, among others) (UNEP Risø, 2016). As such, the CDM serves as a
benchmark and reference for mechanism developed under Article 6.4 of the
Paris Agreement.
The CDM is a project based mechanism, in which individual projects that
reduce emissions below the baseline are awarded Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (CERs). A CDM project is said to be additional if it passes certain tests
of whether the claimed emissions reductions are real. To evaluate addition-
ality, the CDM makes use of third-party audits, once when a project applies
for registration under the CDM and every time that a project applies for the
issuance of CERs. The progress and failure of projects in the CDM is the
topic of Publication II.
Figure 1 shows the development of the price of EUAs and CERs over 2005-
2016. It shows large volatility in the market. The volatility can be attributed
to the design features. At some point, EUAs and CERs were interchangeable,
up to a given quantitative limit. The limit permitted by the current market
15
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Figure 1. Price of EU Allowances (EUA) in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and
Certified Emission Reductions (CER) in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
based on end of day historical price data, from and with permission from the Inter-
continental Exchange ICE.
framework has for all practical purposes been exhausted (Kossoy et al., 2015).
In the period 2005-2007 the price of EUAs dropped to zero because banking
between Phase 1 and 2 was not permitted. Between Phase 3 (2020-2030) and
Phase 4 (2021-2030) there is unlimited banking. Currently, both the market
for EUAs and the market for CERs are oversupplied. Publication II provides
some explanation of the process that has led to the current situation in the
market for CERs.
The introduction of new policy instruments combined with the reticence to
remove existing ones has made the policy space of many sectors of the econ-
omy, in particular power generation, congested. In many countries, power
generation is resposible for a significant share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. From the perspective of global warming, there is just one externality, the
release of GHG. Relying on Tinbergen (1952), one and only one policy instru-
ment is needed to regulate it. In reality, however, climate policy is intertwined
with other areas of policy, among others, security of supply, income distribu-
tion, regional development and trade. For decarbonising power generation,
the EU Member States rely on a combination of a cap-and-trade scheme and
schemes for the promotion of renewable energy sources (RES). The cap-and
trade scheme is union-wide whereas the RES subsidy schemes are national,
with the exception of the Swedish-Norwegian tradable green electricity certifi-
cate scheme (Klessmann et al., 2014). Publication III analyses the interaction
of overlapping climate policy instruments in a dynamic set-up. The dynamic
set-up allows us to study time profile of emissions.
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1.1 Non-cooperative emission taxes
Publication I deals with environmental federalism, the division of responsi-
bility for environmental regulation between different levels of government.
Within environmental federalism, an important question is the efficiency of
non-cooperative environmental standards. A well-established result within
the literature that assumes perfect competition is that a small country has no
incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental standards
when there are no pollution spillovers between states. This has formally been
shown by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988). Assuming that trade policy is not
banned, this result holds regardless of whether countries are large or small,
in the sense of whether an individual country can influence world prices or
not. However, if trade policy is banned, the government of a large country
may use environmental policy to improve its terms of trade. The government
of a small country, has no incentive to depart from the cooperative level of
environmental regulation because it cannot influence the terms of trade and
because failure to internalise the environmental externality reduces welfare.
By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988),
Publication I shows that the result that a small country has no incentive
to depart from the cooperative choice of emissions taxes does not hold for
pollutants that have regional or global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide
(SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2) have. A distinction is made between two
types of regional pollutants, those that affect the level of pollution both in
the source state and in neighbouring states and those that affect the level of
pollution in neighbouring states only. An example of the former is waste water
emissions that flow in the context of the Baltic Sea. An example of the latter
is emissions of SO2 that only affect neighbouring states.
In the absence of cooperation, national governments set the emissions tax
equal to marginal social damage to domestic workers. The non-cooperative
level of emission taxes is efficient for local pollutants but inefficiently low for
regional and global pollutants. The source of the inefficiency is that without
coordination, national governments only take into account costs and benefits
that accrue to domestic consumers. In effect, the utility from more consump-
tion accrue in full to domestic workers, whereas the disutility from more pol-
lution is borne only partially by domestic consumers. An extreme case are
regional pollutants, which affect the level of pollution in neighbouring states
only. Without cooperation, the domestic government has no incentive to regu-
late them. Through cooperation, the pollution externality can be internalised
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and the inefficiency eliminated. It follows that activities responsible for re-
gional and global pollutants, such as fossil-fuel fired power generation and the
associated release of CO2 and SO2, should be regulated at the federal level.
1.2 Time to market in the CDM
The contribution of Publication II is the demonstration of a methodology
for analysing the progress and failure of projects in the CDM. Previous at-
tempts at analysing it, among others, Ambrosi and Kossoy (2010), Koakutsu,
Okubo, Takahashi, Torii, and Fukui (2011), Platonova-Oquab et al. (2012)
and Cormier and Bellassen (2013), are biased because they fail to properly
account for right-censored projects. The methodology relies on modelling the
hazard of the first issuance of CERs. The hazard is allowed to vary both over
time and over duration. Integrated over duration, the hazard of first issuance
gives the time to market, which is defined as the duration between the first
day of the Global Stakeholder Process (GSP), i.e. the date when the existence
of the project becomes public knowledge, and the date of first issuance.
Publication II shows that between GSP start and request for registration
30% of all projects fail, while another 20% fail between request for registration
and first issuance. Failure means that the project owner will not be able to
recuperate any of the costs attributable to registration under the CDM. For
the remaining 50%, the median time to market is 4 years, which does not
include the time it takes to prepare the project documentation and the time
it takes to negotiate a validation contract with an accredited third party.
The considerable time to market created a honey trap for project developers.
Initially, the supply of CERs was small and prices were high, which lured
increasing number of projects to seek registration under the CDM. The flow
of projects gained momentum for years before it became evident that there
was not sufficient demand for CERs.
The data shows a great deal of variation in the hazard of first issuance.
First, project types associated with a low degree of additionality have a high
hazard of first issuance, whereas project types associated with a high degree
of additionally have a low hazard of first issuance. It follows that the ad-
ditional projects are least likely to issue CERs, whereas the non-additional
projects are the most likely to issue CERs. Second, other things being equal,
projects hosted by China have a very high hazard of first issuance, whereas
projects hosted by Least Developed Countries exhibit a very low hazard of
first issuance. This provides some explanation of why the number of CERs
18
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awarded to Chinese projects is disproportionately large relative to the number
of projects hosted by China. Third, the larger the scale of the project, the
larger the hazard of first issuance. The small-scale methodologies contain a
number of concessions compared with the large-scale methodologies. Other
things being equal, these concessions should reduce the time to market. How-
ever, the data shows the opposite. Fourth, between 2008-2009 and 2010-2012,
the hazard of first issuance was reduced while the hazard of the submission of
a registration request was increased. This shows that the streamlined CDM
procedures, requested by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in Copenhagen in December 2009,
were a mixed success.
1.3 Overlapping climate policy instruments
Publication III illustrates a paradox in which overlapping climate policy in-
struments may, in addition to increasing the cost of compliance, have the unin-
tended consequence of accelerating rather than decelerating global warming.
The insight follows from a dynamic model. In the model, quota obligation
for renewables is introduced alongside a carbon budget. A dynamic model
allows to study how the schedule at which the carbon budget is exhausted
and released to the atmosphere is affected by a quota obligation. The release
schedule determines the global temperature response.
The inefficiency is attributable to a reallocation of emissions, and conse-
quently abatement, under the carbon budget. With a calibration for the EU-
28 power generation sector, the quota obligation roughly doubles the costs
of complying with the carbon budget. The acceleration of global warming is
attributable to a front-loading of the exhaustion of the carbon budget. The
introduction of a quota obligation suppresses the carbon price and induces
a switch from low carbon intensity fossil fuels to high carbon intensity fossil
fuels in generation to supply residual demand. Residual demand is defined
as demand met by non-reneweables. The fuel switches front-load the release
of the carbon budget. A front-loaded release schedule translates into higher
levels of cumulative CO2 and a larger global temperature response. With a
calibration for the EU-28 power generation sector, at its largest, the front-
loading amounts to 5.5 GtCO2 in 2035, which is equal to 5-6 years’ worth of
emissions from electricity generation in EU-28.
The model is set-up in the context of the EU’s Winter Package, which reaf-
firms EU’s commitment to a binding target for the share of RES of final energy
19
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consumption by 2030 (European Commission, 2016). The literature that re-
lates to Green Paradox, which was originally suggested by Sinn (2008), has
analysed the situation where the first-best instrument is not available. In
comparison, in the model of Publication III, the global warming externality
is completely internalised by the carbon budget. A cap-and-trade scheme for
CO2 promotes RES in power generation by a pass-through of the carbon price
on the the electricity price. It is shown that by suppressing the carbon price,
the quota obligation undermines investments dependent on the carbon price.
This creates a need for further market intervention in the form of additional
support for RES. By promoting coal fired generation at the expense of gas
fired generation, the quota obligation may bring forward the closure of gas-
fired power stations, many of which currently serve to balance intermittent
wind and solar power. This creates a need for further market intervention in
the form of payments for reserve capacity.
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Efficiency of non-cooperative emission
taxes in perfectly competitive markets
Roland Magnusson
Abstract
With the current efforts to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases and
other cross border pollutants, the question of environmental federalism is as
important as ever. By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab
(1987, 1988), we show that the well established result within environmental
federalism, that the government of a small country has no incentive to depart
from the cooperative choice of environmental standards, does not hold for pol-
lutants that have regional or global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide and
carbon dioxide has.
JEL Codes: H77, Q58
1 Introduction
With the current efforts to cut the emission of greenhouse gases, the question
of environmental federalism - the division of responsibility for environmental
regulation between different levels of government - deserves as much attention
as ever. Current implementations vary. In the EU, for example, the price of
emitting CO2 has been harmonised for major stationary emitters. However,
in other areas of environmental management, there are still large differences
within the EU. One of these fields is the level of support to renewable electricity
sources. Within this field, cooperation attempts at the EU level have been
short-lived due to fierce opposition they have been met by some member states.
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Within environmental federalism, an important question is the efficiency of
non-cooperative environmental standards. A well established result within the
literature is that, in perfectly competitive markets, a small state has no in-
centive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental standards as
long as pollution generated in one jurisdiction doesn’t spill over into another.
Two of the first ones to show this formally were Oates and Schwab (1987,
1988). Our objective is to extend their analysis by allowing for regional, e.g.
SO2, and global pollutants, e.g. CO2. Most previous work, both within the
strand that assumes perfect and within the strand that assumes imperfect
competition, only consider local pollutants. Cross-border pollutants are, in
our opinion, underrepresented. Thus, our aim is to contribute to the strand of
literature that deals with them. We acknowledge that our assumption of per-
fect competition, inherited from Oates and Schwab, is a crude simplification,
but we hope that our analysis will serve as a starting point for more elaborate
analyses.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the main contri-
butions within the field of environmental federalism. In Section 3, we outline
the model and derive equilibrium conditions for the amount of capital em-
ployed and emissions generated by each state. In Section 4, we study some
of the comparative statics of a unilateral emission tax increase. In Section 5
and 6, we derive the non-cooperative and cooperative choice of emission taxes,
respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 A brief literature review
Since the early papers of the 1970s and 1980s, among others Cumberland
(1979, 1981) and Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988), the body of literature within
environmental federalism has expanded along a number of different themes.
Most importantly, with new insights on how to model imperfect competition,
the literature has expanded to include markets where either producers or ju-
risdictions, or both, can affect prices.
A well established result within the strand that assumes perfect competition
between the polluting firms is that a small country has no incentive to depart
from the cooperative choice of environmental standards, assuming there are no
pollution spillovers between states, see e.g. Rauscher (1994) or Ulph (1997).
If trade policy is not banned, this result holds regardless of whether the coun-
tries are large or small, i.e. whether they can influence world prices or not.
However, if trade policy is banned, the government of a large country may use
Publication I
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environmental policy to improve its terms of trade. The government of a small
country, however, has no incentive to depart from the cooperative equilibrium,
because by assumption it cannot influence the country’s terms of trade, and
failure to internalise environmental externalities is welfare reducing.
The results within the strand of literature that assumes less than perfect
competition between the polluting firms are less conclusive. Early work within
this strand relies on oligopoly models in the tradition of Brander and Krugman
(1983) and Brander and Spencer (1985), and assumes that firms are immobile.
Relying on the Cournot duopoly presented by Brander and Spencer (1985),
Barrett (1994) shows that in the absence of trade policy, governments will bid
down each others’ environmental standards to shift profits toward domestic
producers. However, if firms compete in prices rather than quantities, they will
bid up each others’ standards. More recent work, originating fromMarkusen et
al. (1995), assumes that firms are mobile. As with immobile firms, the finding
of Markusen et al. is that without cooperation, governments will either bid up
or down each others’ emission taxes. However, the determining factor is not
whether firms play Cournot or Stackelberg, but the disutility of pollution. If
the disutility of pollution is large enough, the states will increase their emission
taxes until the polluting firms are driven out of business.
Subsequent research has made additional simplifications, especially regard-
ing transportation costs while relaxing others, such as the number of countries
(Rauscher 1995) and the number of firms (Greaker 2003, Hoel 1997, Ulph &
Valentini 2001). With exception of Rauscher, the results are in line with
Markusen et al. Of the above mention analyses, Rauscher is the only who
allows for pollution spillovers. He reports that the opportunity cost, in terms
of environmental damages, of undercutting foreign environmental regulations
becomes infinitesimally small if pollution is perfectly global.
Within the non-competitive strand, Pflüger (2001) pursues an alternative
strategy, but as most of the previous research, assumes that pollution is strictly
local. Relying on the model of monopolistic competition by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), Pflüger shows that choice of emissions tax by one state imposes a num-
ber externalities on the other, both positive and negative. Non-cooperative
taxes are lower than cooperative taxes if the importance of emissions in pro-
duction, relative to labour, is small in comparison to transport costs and the
mark-up on average variable costs. However, in contrast with the oligopoly
model by Markusen et al. (1995), in Pflüger the disutility of pollution is





Following Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988), we analyse the choice of emission
taxes, τ i, in an assymmetric general equilibrium model of a federal economy
of small states. The states are small in the sense that they cannot influence
the rate of return to capital, R, and thus treat it as exogenous. In the spirit
of the original model, we assume that capital and goods are perfectly mobile.
Labour, in contrast, is perfectly immobile. Thus, the supply of labour is fixed
in each state.
Emissions, Ei, are generated as a by-product in the manufacturing of a
homogeneous private good. Besides emissions, production requires capital,
Ki, and labour, Li. Following Oates and Schwab, we assume that the good is
manufactured by perfectly competitive firms with technologies that may vary
across states, but all of which exhibit constant returns to scale with regard to
the three inputs.
The property of constant returns to scale and the assumption of a fixed
supply of labour allow us to write the production functions in per worker
terms, F i(Ki, Li, Ei) = Lif i(ki, ei). By partial derivation of it with respect
to Ki, Li and Ei, we obtain the marginal products of capital, labour, and
emissions as
F iKi(·) = f iki(·), (1)
F iLi(·) = f i(·)− kif iki(·)− eif iei(·), and (2)
F iEi(·) = f iei(·), (3)
respectively, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. We assume that the
marginal products of f i(ki, ei) are positive but diminishing, and that f i
kiei
(·) >
0 and f i
eiki
(·) > 0, i.e. that capital and emissions are q-compliments, using
the definition by Seidman (1989).
As price takers, firms will employ capital up to the point where the marginal
unit earns just enough to cover its cost. Thus, in equilibrium,
f iki(·) = R, for all states i, (4)
by choosing the private good as the numéraire. As with capital, firms choose
a level of emissions which equates the marginal product of emission with the
tax rate. Thus, in equilibrium,
f iei(·) = τ i, for all states i, (5)
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We assume that within each state, workers are identical in both preferences
and productive capacity, and that they are paid a wage equal to their marginal
product. In addition to wages, workers receive tax income, eiτ i, and exogenous
income, bi. For simplicity, we assume that all capital is owned by foreigners.
With this simplification, we can write the budget constraint of the represen-
tative worker, resident of state i as
xi = f i(·)− kif iki(·)− eif iei(·) + eiτ i + bi (6)
where xi is the consumption of the private good. Consumption of it increases
utility ui = ui(xi, Oi), whereas exposure to pollution, Oi, reduces utility. We
define the level of pollution as Oi = Oi(e1, ..., ei, ..., en), where the sign of the
partial derivatives depend on the type of pollutant. We examine four distinct
types of pollutants, shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Types of pollutants.
Type of pollutant Pollution function characteristics
Local Oiei(·) > 0, Oiej (·) = 0 ∀j = i
Regional and partially transboundary Oiej (·) > 0 ∀i, j
Regional and perfectly transboundary Oiei(·) = 0, Oiej (·) > 0 ∃j = i
Global pollutant Oiei(·) = Oiej (·) > 0 ∀i, j
We distinguish here between two types of regional pollutants, those that
affect the level of pollution both in the source state and in neighbouring states,
and those that affect neighbouring states only. An example of the former is
wastewater emissions is context of the Baltic Sea. An example of the latter is
emissions of SO2 that only affect neighbouring states.
4 Comparative statics of an unilateral emission tax change
Total differentiation of the equilibrium conditions in Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 with
respect to ki, ei and τ i, yields the following system of equations⎡

















⎦ dτ i. (7)



























(·) > 0, as we show in the Appendix.
Thus, increasing the tax rate reduces both the amount of capital employed
and the amount emissions generated by a particular state.
5 Non-cooperative choice of emission taxes
Without coordination, national governments maximise the utility of the repre-
sentative domestic consumer, ui, subject to budget constraint in Eq. 6 and to
the factor demands in Eq. 4 and Eq. 5. The Lagrangian for the non-cooperative
maximisation problem can be written as
Γ ≡ ui(xi, Oi)− λ[xi − bi − eiτ i − f i(·) + kif iki(·) + eif iei(·)]
− γ[f iki(·)−R]− η[f iei(·)− τ i]
(10)
and the FOCs, with respect to xi, ei, ki and τ i, respectively, as
λ = uixi(·), (11)
uiOi(·)Oiei(·) + λτ i − λkif ikiei(·)− λeif ieiei(·)
− γf ikiei(·)− ηf ieiei(·) = 0,
(12)
− λkif ikiki(·)− λeif ieiki(·)− γf ikiki(·)− ηf ieiki(·) = 0, and (13)
η = −λei. (14)
By substituting Eq. 14 into Eq. 13, we obtain γ = −λki. By substituting
this and the expressions for the two other Lagrange multipliers into Eq. 12
yield









Eq. 15 says that, without cooperation, national governments set a tax equal
to marginal social damage to domestic workers. The damage is measured in
terms of the willingness to sacrifice consumption in return for a decrease in
the level of pollution.
6 Cooperative choice of emission taxes
Through cooperation, the welfare of neighbouring states is taken into consid-
eration when deciding on the level of emission tax. Thus, the constraints are
the same as in the non-cooperative case with one addition, the constraint of
not reducing welfare abroad below a certain level. Here, this level is given
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by ûs. The additional constraint captures the effect of decisions in one state
on the welfare in other states. With these changes, the Lagrangian for the
cooperative maximisation problem can be written as
Λ ≡ ui(xi, Oi)− λ[xi − bi − eiτ i − f i(·) + kif iki(·) + eif iei(·)]




ξs[ûs − us(xs, Os)] (16)
Since ξs = −∂Λ/∂ûs, we can we can interpret ξs as the shadow prices, mea-
sured in units of ui, that domestic consumers must to pay to increase utility
abroad. ∂Λ/∂ûs ≤ 0 because the only way for domestic consumers to improve
welfare abroad is by reducing emissions. Assuming that the domestic level of
emissions is optimal, reducing them further cannot be welfare improving. It
follows that ξs ≥ 0.
The FOCs, with respect to xi, ei, ki and τ i, respectively, can be written as
λ = uixi(·), (17)
uiOi(·)Oiei(·) + λτ i − λkif ikiei(·)− λeif ieiei(·)





s, Os)Osei(·) = 0,
(18)
− λkif ikiki(·)− λeif ieiki(·)− γf ikiki(·)− ηf ieiki(·) = 0, and (19)
η = −λei. (20)
By performing the same substitutions as in the non-cooperative case, we
obtain



















The difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative tax level, Eq. 21












which represents the negative trans-state externality in our model, i.e. the
effect of domestic emission on the level of pollution, and welfare, abroad. For
regional and global pollutants, the term is larger than zero, because there is
a state abroad for which Os
ei
(·) > 0. It follows, that for regional and global
pollutants, the non-cooperative level of emission taxes is inefficiently low. For
local pollutants, the term is zero, because Os
ei
(·) = 0 for all states s abroad. It
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follows, that for local pollutants, the non-cooperative level of emission taxes
is efficient.
Regional pollutants that are perfectly trans-boundary, e.g. emission of SO2
that only affect neighbouring states, illustrates nicely the lack of incentives.
The domestic government has no incentive to regulate them since the damage is
borne entirely by neighbouring states. Thus, the domestic government chooses
a zero tax rate. Obviously, this is inefficient.
7 Discussion and policy implications
The inefficiency arises because national governments, by assumption, care only
for costs and benefits that accrue to domestic consumers; the utility from
more consumption accrue in full to domestic workers, whereas the disutility
from more pollution is borne only partially by domestic consumers. The only
way to internalise the pollution externality, and remove the inefficiency, is by
cooperation. Thus, our recommendation is that that the regulation of regional
and global pollutants, or the activities that cause them, such as the use of fossil
fuels in electricity generation and the associated generation of CO2 and SO2,
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The per-worker profit of a firm producing in state i is given by f i(ki, ei)−Rki−
τ iei. The FOCs of the firm’s problem are f i
ki
(·) − R = 0 and f i
ei
(·) − τ i = 0.
The SOCs is that the Hessian,
H =
⎡








is negative definite. For negative definiteness, the leading principal minors
must alternate in sign, with the first leading principal minor being negative,
i.e. f i
kiki
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Time to market in the CDM: variation
over project characteristics and time
Roland Magnusson
Abstract
Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions
(CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects,
that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail
to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the
context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the
Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a
median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of
the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely
to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not
being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This
presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that
rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is
shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations
measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.
Policy relevance: This article develops a novel method for analysing dura-
tions measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous
studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM
projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an un-
derstanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons
from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in
terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institu-
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tional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future
offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and
the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much
in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and
procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional
carbon trading schemes.
Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), climate change, emis-
sions trading schemes, Kyoto Protocol, policy instruments, UNFCCC
1 Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of three flexibility mech-
anisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Through the CDM, Annex I Parties can
meet part of their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by reducing emissions
in non-Annex I Parties, where the cost of reducing emissions is presumably
lower than in the Annex I countries.1 The CDM has two objectives, to lower
compliance costs for Annex I countries and to assist non-Annex I countries in
achieving sustainable development (UNFCCC, 1998, p. 11).2
By the end of 2012, 190 states had ratified the Kyoto Protocol (one, Canada,
had withdrawn from it). Of these, 38 states were classified as Annex I Parties
and the rest as non-Annex I Parties. Of the 152 non-Annex I Parties, 105
states were host to a CDM project (UNEP Risø, 2013). By the same time,
a total of 12,000 projects had applied for registration under the CDM, 5500
projects had been registered, and 2000 projects had issued a total of 1.2 billion
Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) (UNEP Risø, 2013).3
The CERs represent the reduction in GHG emissions achieved by the CDM
projects. Annex I Parties can use CERs to meet part of their obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol. Equivalently, companies within the EU can use CERs to
meet part of their obligations under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS).
Between 2005 and 2012, the potential supply of CERs grew exponentially,
1Annex I Parties are industrialized countries with binding targets under the Kyoto
Protocol. Non-Annex I Parties are developing countries with no binding targets under
the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998).
2Although not an explicit objective of the CDM, it is often argued that one way
in which the CDM can contribute to sustainable development is through technology
transfer (see e.g. Haites et al., 2006).
3Each CER corresponds to the reduction of one tonne CO2 equivalent.
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while demand, especially from companies within the EU ETS, declined as
many of the companies gradually exhausted their quota for the use of CERs.4
In the face of decreasing demand and uncertainty about the continuation of
the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012, the price of CERs was close to zero at the
end of 2012. At the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8) in December 2012
in Doha, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed on an amendment to the
Protocol that establishes a second commitment period, running from 2013 to
2020. However, by the end of November 2013, only four Parties had ratified it,
which casts some doubt over whether the amendment will ever become legally
binding. Even if it does, it is not clear whether the pledges contained in it are
ambitious enough to spur new demand for CERs.
Research about the CDM is nonetheless warranted, because the CDM is the
leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and
sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity. As such, it
will serve as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among
others, for the domestic offset scheme currently emerging in China.5 Research
about the CDM is also warranted because of the CDM’s potential role of
acting as a bridge to a legally binding climate agreement, expected in 2020.
With additional demand, the CDM could help to sustain momentum during
negotiations for the agreement.
The CDM relies on the principle of baseline-and-credit. A central design
element of a baseline-and-credit scheme is that the credits are issued ex post
based on monitored emission reductions. As such, it is very different from
a cap-and-trade scheme, such as the EU ETS. Compared with cap-and-trade
schemes, baseline-and-credit schemes have the added complexity of establish-
ing the baseline. The baseline is the counterfactual, i.e. the emissions in
the absence of the additional revenue brought by the CDM.6 Any emission
reductions below this baseline are said to be additional. To evaluate addition-
ality, the CDM makes use of third-party audits, once when a project applies
4Actual supply is lower than potential supply because many CDM projects have
extended their monitoring periods, and thus postponed issuance, in the hope of higher
CERs prices in the future.
5In China, to reduce the cost of compliance, companies covered by the regional carbon-
trading schemes are expected to be allowed to offset between 5 per cent and 8 per
cent of their emissions with Chinese-issued carbon credits from emission reduction
projects located in China (Chen, 2012).
6For grid-connected wind power, the baseline is the CO2 emissions of the fossil fuel-
based power generation that the wind power displaces (CDM EB, 2009, p. 8). If the
wind power plants would have been built in any case, there is no displacement, the
baseline is zero, and there is no reduction in emissions.
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for registration under the CDM, and then every time a project applies for
issuance of CERs. The CDM shares many common features with other offset
schemes, among others, the Climate Action Reserve in the US and the Carbon
Farming Initiative in Australia. The common features include, among others,
methodologies for establishing the baseline and the use of third-party audits.
The third-party audits are carried out by independent entities, typically
private firms, known as Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). The DOEs
are contracted and paid by the project developers. The DOEs are accredited
by the CDM Executive Board (EB), the main governing body of the CDM.
The CDM EB operates under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). Thus, in
terms of governance, the CDM relies on a mix of private and public agents.
Over the years, the CDM has been criticized on many accounts. Two ma-
jor subjects for criticism are the lack of additionality and transaction cost.
The two are closely related, because assessing additionality incurs transaction
costs, both in terms of monetary costs and non-monetary costs such as time.
Without additionality, the CDM is merely a mechanism for income transfer
from Annex I to non-Annex I countries (Burniaux, Chateau, Dellink, Duval,
& Jamet, 2009). The question of additionality has been addressed by (among
others) Michaelowa and Purohit (2007) and Schneider (2009), and more re-
cently by Zhang and Wang (2011). All of them find some evidence of a lack
of additionality, but the conclusiveness varies, which is not surprising given
that assessing additionality is notoriously difficult, as already noted by Grubb,
Vrolijk, Brack, and Forsyth (1999).
The question of monetary costs has been addressed by a number of sources.
Among the first were Michaelowa, Stronzik, Eckermann, and Hunt (2003)
and Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005).7 More recent research includes a technical
report by the World Bank (2010).8 In contrast, the question of the delays
caused by the approval processes and the more general question of how long it
takes to bring CDM projects to the market has attracted very little research.
7Michaelowa et al. (2003) expresses the concern that small projects, in terms of their
emission reduction potential, are at a disadvantage relative to large projects because
many of the direct costs are independent of project size.
8In the World Bank carbon funds, the costs associated with preparation of a project
amount to an average of $200,000 per project. This cost includes the cost of due
diligence to ensure compliance with the World Bank social and environmental safe-
guard, but excludes the cost of validation and periodic verifications. The World Bank
experience shows an average validation cost of $28,000 and an average verification
cost of $20,000, with little distinction between small- and large-scale projects. This
is because prices for validation and verification are typically not based on the size of
the project but on its complexity (World Bank, 2010).
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The purpose of this article is to fill this gap.
There are three technical reports published by the World Bank and the
Institute for Global Environmental Studies (IGES) (Ambrosi & Kossoy, 2010;
Koakutsu, Okubo, Takahashi, Torii, & Fukui, 2011; Platonova-Oquab et al.,
2012) that analyse the delays in bringing CERs to the market. However,
because the three reports look at slightly different durations along the CDM
project cycle they are not directly comparable.
The common finding of all three reports is that the durations have increased
over time.9 Whether this is true or not is impossible to say, because all
three reports suffer from the same sample selection bias. The bias arises
as a result of how the sample that is taken to represent a certain year is
chosen. The sample for a given year only includes those durations that are
known to have ended during that year. As a result, projects with a short
duration are systematically selected to represent early years, whereas projects
with exceptionally long durations are systematically selected to represent later
years. Given this systematic bias, it is no surprise that all three reports find
that durations have increased over time.10
In addition, there is one very recent piece of research by Cormier and Bel-
lassen (2013) that analyses the relative sizes of different risks that affect CER
creation. The shortcoming of the analysis by Cormier and Bellassen is that it
relies on an ambiguous approach to identifying the projects that are ”bogged
down”, i.e. failed. Their analysis is likely to underestimate the durations
because it incorrectly classifies projects with exceptionally long durations as
failed.11
9Ambrosi & Kossoy (2010, p. 42) report that, between 2005 and 2009, the time
needed for the average project to move from GSP start to registration increased from
200 days to 600 days, and during the same period, the time needed for the average
project to move from registration to first issuance increased from 100 days to 600
days. Koakutsu et al. (2011, p. 11) report that, between Q1 2006 and Q2 2011, the
average number of days from registration to first issuance increased from 150 days
to 870 days. Platonova-Oquab et al. (2012, p. 7) report that, between H1 2005
and H2 2011, the average time required for a project to move from GSP start to the
submission of a request for registration increased from 270 days to 520 days.
10For example, for the time to market, the sample taken to represent year 2007 would
include projects that began the GSP in the years 2004-2007, while the sample taken to
represent the year 2012 would include projects that began the GSP in years 2005-2011,
i.e. from a much larger range.
11Cormier and Bellassen (2013) regress the projects’ characteristics on validation
duration. Only the successfully validated projects are included in the regression.
Based on the regression results they estimate the expected validation duration of each
project. Projects that have been in validation for longer than the expected duration
plus twice the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression are classified as
”bogged down”, i.e. failed. The same is done for issuance.
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This article will answer two questions. First, what is the distribution of the
time to market across all projects that started the Global Stakeholder Process
(GSP) in the period 2003-2012? Here, the time to market is defined as the
duration between GSP start and first issuance. Second, how does the time
to market depend on host country, the technology on which a project relies,
the scale of the project, and time? While the second question is actually
the determinant of the first, answering the first question in isolation from the
second is warranted because no unbiased estimate of the distribution of the
time to market has been presented, or indeed of any other duration measured
along the CDM project cycle. Answering the first question in isolation from
the second is also warranted because the answer to the second question is
subject to the omitted variable bias, whereas the answer to the first question
is not.
The answer to the second question is subject to omitted variable bias be-
cause not all of the variables that affect the time to market are included in
the regression model on which the answer relies. If some of the omitted vari-
ables, e.g. the (unknown) efforts of some members of the CDM EB to promote
certain project types, are correlated with variables included in the regression,
then the effects of the included variables will be either over- or underestimated
to compensate for the missing variables. When identifying causal effects, the
omitted variable bias is a concern. When predicting how, for example, hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs) projects fare compared to hydro-power projects, the
omitted variable bias is less of a concern.
Analysing how the time to market depends on host country is interesting
because it shows how well different non-Annex I countries have managed to
capitalize on the CDM projects they host. Analysing how the time to mar-
ket depends on the expected emissions reductions of a project is interesting,
because it may tell something about the small-scale methodologies. The small-
scale methodologies were created to reduce transaction costs for projects below
a certain threshold.12 Analysing how the time to market depends on time is
interesting because of the finding by the technical reports cited above that
durations along the CDM project cycle have increased over time. The depen-
dence on the time to market may also reveal something about the success of
the streamlined CDM procedures, as required by CMP 5 in December 2009.
To answer these questions this article relies on survival analysis, which has
12With respect to DOE costs, the small-scale methodologies have not been very suc-
cessful, based on the World Bank experience, which shows little difference between
small-scale and large-scale projects (World Bank, 2010).
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its origin in clinical studies. The study of the duration between GSP start
and first issuance has remarkable similarities with the study of the duration
between the onset of a cancer and death, for example. Cancer patients have
different characteristics, as do CDM projects. Cases of cancer occur at different
times, as do GSP starts. At any given point in time, some cancer patients will
be right-censored, in the sense that death has not yet occurred. Analogously,
at any given point in time, some CDM projects will be right-censored, in
the sense that first issuance has not yet occurred. Cancer patients undergo
different treatments that may or may not affect the hazard of death, as do
CDM projects, in terms of changes to CDM procedures. The changes in the
CDM procedures may, or may not, move a project closer to first issuance.
The one difference is that, whereas the duration between the onset of cancer
and death is always finite, because death is inevitable, the time between GSP
start and first issuance may be infinite. The duration between GSP start and
first issuance is infinite if a project will never issue any CERs.
Modelling the time to market as such is not technically feasible because
of censoring. The issue is how to deal with the right-censored project for
which the time to market is not yet known. The solution is to model the
hazard of first issuance, which is a function of duration, measured in days
from GSP start. Integrated over duration, the hazard of first issuance gives
the time to market. The hazard of first issuance is defined as the instantaneous
probability that a CDM project issues the first CERs conditional on the fact
that the project has not issued any CERs before.
Compared with previous studies, the advantage of modelling the hazard of
first issuance is that there is no need to resort to sampling, as in the technical
reports published by the World Bank and IGES cited above. Nor is there
a need to explicitly identify the projects that are ”bogged down” either at
validation or at issuance as in Cormier and Bellassen (2013).
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the back-
ground. Section 3 presents the analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
This section is divided into four subsections. The first presents the CDM
project cycle. The second shows how the price of CERs has changed over
time. The third discusses how the procedures and rules that govern the CDM
have changed over time. The fourth describes the data.
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2.1 CDM project cycle
The CDM project cycle is defined as the sequence of events that leads to the
issuance of CERs, as shown in Figure 1. Within this sequence of events, the
main duration that is studied is the time to market, which is defined as the
duration between GSP start and first issuance.13 For comparison, outside the
main narrative, the analysis looks at the duration between GSP start and
request for registration.14
Figure 1. The CDM project cycle in terms of the events that lead to first issuance.
Table 1 shows the main agents involved in the CDM. The project developer
initiates the project cycle by taking the decision to apply for registration
(Event 1, Figure 1).15 Once the decision has been taken, the project developer
must complete the project documentation using a standard format known as
the Project Design Document (PDD) (Event 2). The PDD describes how the
project meets the requirements of the CDM (CPD, 2012, p. 15).
13Because the time to market is measured from the start of the GSP, it excludes the
time it takes to prepare the project documentation and the time it takes to negotiate
and sign a validation contract with a DOE.
14Studying the duration between GSP start and registration would be more interest-
ing than studying the duration between GSP start and registration request. However,
due to a CDM rule change that allows backdating, registration dates for projects that
submitted a request for registration before 11 December 2010 are not comparable with
the registration dates of projects that did it on, or after, 11 December 2010 (CDM
EB, 2011, p. 9).




Table 1. Main agents involved in the CDM
Agent Composition Role
CMP Assembly of the parties to
the Kyoto Protocol
Guidance of the CDM EB
CDM EB 10 members and 10 alterna-
tive members from Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol
Issuance of CERs, registra-
tion of projects, approval
of methodologies, accredita-
tion of DOEs
UNFCCC Secretariat UN professional staff Supports to the CDM EB
DOEs Private third-party auditors
accredited by the CDM EB
Validation and verification
DNAs Designated National Au-
thorities of Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol
The DNA of the host coun-
try issues a Letter of Ap-
proval (LoA)
Project developers Private and public entities Developing projects that
qualify under the CDM
Notes: CMP, Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol; CDM EB, CDM Executive Board.
Source: Streck (2007) and CDM Policy Dialogue (CPD) (2012).
The CDM requires a third-party assessment of the project by a Desig-
nated Operational Entity (DOE). The assessment is done twice, first when
the project applies for registration and second when the project applies for
CERs. The first assessment is known as the validation and the second as the
verification. The project developer chooses and signs a validation contract
with a DOE (Event 3) (CPD, 2012, p. 16).
Once the validation contract is signed, the DOE initiates the GSP by making
the PDD publicly available on the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) CDM website for a period of 30 days (Event
4) (CPD, 2012, p. 16). During this time parties affected by the proposed
project activity may leave comments on it. The GSP start marks the time
when the existence of the project becomes public knowledge. Consequently,
the GSP start also marks the date when the project is recorded in the CDM
project databases maintained by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) Risø Centre and the IGES.16
If the DOE finds, as a result of the validation, that the project is in compli-
ance with the requirements of the CDM, it submits a request for registration
to the CDM EB (Event 5). If three members of the CDM EB request a review,
16Durations that begin before the GSP start cannot be studied because of this.
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registration will be delayed and the project might be rejected. If no review is
requested, the project is registered by the CDM EB (Event 6) (CPD, 2012, p.
17).
Once registered, the project is eligible for CER. The CERs are issued ex-
post, based on monitored emissions reductions. The CDM rules require that
the authenticity of the emission reduction is verified by a DOE (CPD, 2012, pp.
18-19). The process of verification is very similar to the process of validation.
The project developer chooses and signs a verification contract with a DOE
(Event 7). The DOE submits a request for issuance to the CDM EB (Event 8),
and if no review is requested the CDM EB issues the CERs (Event 9) (CPD,
2012, pp. 21-24).
2.2 The price of CERs
CERs are traded both in spot and forward markets. Figure 2 shows the
average monthly price of a front future contract with delivery in December.
It shows that between January 2009 and July 2011, the price was relatively
stable. After July 2011, the price gradually decreased to close to zero. The
commonly held belief is that the price has dropped because of oversupply of
credits from the CDM and the mechanism for Joint Implementation, CDM’s


















Figure 2. Average monthly price of a front future CER contract with delivery in
December. Source: ICE Data, http://data.theice.com (with permission of ICE Data).
2.3 CDM procedures and rules
To facilitate analyses of how the hazard of first issuance has changed over
time, time must be split into periods. The periods must be sufficiently long
for the estimation to be reliable. Time is split into the following periods:
Jan01-Dec07, Jan08-Dec09, and Jan10-Dec12. The split is very similar to
that suggested by the World Bank (Platonova-Oquab et al., 2012).
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Although the split is somewhat arbitrary, it serves the purpose of show-
ing what the time to market was in the period that followed the CMP 5
in December 2009 in Copenhagen, compared with the period that preceded
it. Jan08-Dec09 is chosen as the baseline, against which the hazard of first
issuance in Jan10-Dec12 is compared. The period Jan01-Dec07 is excluded
from the baseline because, before 2008, the regulation was driven by the need
to kickstart the mechanism.
Between 2001 and 2007, regulation was driven by the need to improve market
liquidity for CERs by pushing projects through the project cycle as fast as pos-
sible (Gillenwater & Seres, 2011, p. 189; Platonova-Oquab et al., p. 2). One of
the policies aimed at increasing market liquidity was that of allowing projects
to claim CERs retroactively, before the date of registration (Michaelowa et
al., 2007, p. 11).17
In 2008, the focus of regulation was shifted towards increased scrutiny
(Platonova-Oquab et al., p. 2). This shift was, at least partially, driven by
concerns about the integrity of the mechanism expressed by, among others,
Michaelowa and Purohit (2007) and Schneider (2009). The main concern was
the lack of additionality.
In 2010, in response to a request from CMP 5, the CDM EB initiated a
series of reforms to streamline and speed up the CDM procedures.18 One
of the main drivers of these reforms was the widespread discontent among
project developers over the delays in registration and issuance (see e.g. IETA,
2009). Studying the effect of these reforms is interesting, because in their 2010
annual report to the CMP, the CDM EB (2010, p. 6) says that the ”main
achievement during the reporting period was the streamlining of procedures”.
The International Emissions Trading Organisation (IETA, 2010) also took
note of these reforms in their 2010 report, but noted that the reforms have
not been in place long enough for the organization to make a judgement on
them.
The hypothesis is, all other things being equal, that the streamlined proce-
dures increased the hazard of first issuance as well as the hazard of request for
registration, and thus reduced the duration of the CDM project cycle.
17This rule applied to projects that had started operation before 18 November 2004
and that had submitted a request for registration by 31 March 2007. Later projects
may not claim CERs before the date of registration (COP, 2002, p. 2).
18One of the streamlined procedures is the two-tiered assessment of a request for
registration, which replaced the earlier rule, according to which each request for reg-
istration had to pass through three independent checks, by the UNFCCC Secretariat,
the Registration and Issuance Team, and the CDM EB. The new procedure was in-




Due to the public nature of the CDM there is very good information available
on every CDM project. The information is managed and made public by the
UNFCCC. The UNEP Risø Centre and IGES both maintain readily accessible
databases of this information (IGES, 2013; UNEP Risø, 2013).19 Each time
a project starts the GSP, a new record of it is added to both databases.
This article relies on the UNEP Risø database (with permission of UNEP
Risø Centre), updated on 1 January 2013, because identifying and removing
duplicates while preserving the date of the first GSP start is easier in the
UNEP Risø data than in the IGES data.20
The following information from the UNEP Risø database is utilized: host
country, project type, whether a project relies on a small-scale methodology
or not, expected yearly emission reduction in kilotonnes of carbon dioxide
equivalent (ktCO2e), issuance success
21, date of first GSP start, date of request
for registration, and date of first issuance.
Categories of host countries and project types below a certain threshold are
merged. This threshold is set at either 10 or 25 projects that have issued
CERs.22 The scale of the project is defined as the PDD estimate of the
expected yearly emissions reduction adjusted with past issuance success of
similar projects. Given the systematic tendency of some project types to
under-deliver, the PDD estimate is adjusted with the average issuance success
of projects of the same type. Nonetheless, the scale contains uncertainty.
Actual issuance may be different.
19In addition to a range of static information, the UNEP Risø database records the
dates of the following registration-related events: date of first GSP start, resubmission
date, date of host LoA, date of registration request, start date of the request review
period (if any), and date of registration. In addition, it records the following issuance-
related events: date of crediting period start, date of first issuance, and end of most
recent monitoring period.
20The same project may need to complete the GSP more than once, e.g. because of
material changes to the PDD after the first GSP has been completed. In this case,
the DOE may require that the GSP is repeated, so that anyone who feels affected by
the project may leave comments on the revised PDD. The time to market is measured
from the start of the first GSP. Thus, in analysing the time to market, subsequent
GSP starts are of no interest. Completing the GSP more than once is likely to add
delay, which will show up in the time to market, which is measured from the start of
the first GSP.
21Issuance success is defined as ”CERs issued divided by the number of CERs ex-
pected in the PDD for the same period”.
22The threshold is defined in terms of projects that have issued CERs and not in
terms of projects that have started the GSP because it is the number of projects that
have issued CERs that determines the reliability of the estimation.
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The following categorization is used for scale: less than 50 ktCO2e per year,
between 50 and 500 ktCO2e per year, and above 500 ktCO2e per year. Given
that the categorization is somewhat arbitrary, two alternative definitions for
scale are explored: one in which scale enters the regression as a continuous
variable and another where scale is either small or large depending on whether
the project relies on a small-scale or a large-scale methodology.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics. It shows the number of projects
per category of host country, category of project type, and category of project
scale. For each category it shows the number of projects that have started the
GSP, the number of projects that have requested registration, and the number
of projects that have issued CERs. For curiosity, the last column shows the
number of CERs issued for each category by the end of December 2012. The
table shows that China is the largest host country, followed by India. It also
shows that China has been issued a disproportionately large number of CERs,
disproportionate, that is, with respect to the number of projects to which
China is host.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics per category of host country, project type, and scale













Host Host countries < 10 iss 787 357 78 31.8
LDCs 123 56 10 0.3
Argentina 68 35 13 9.4
Brazil 628 290 134 78.3
Chile 143 76 27 11.0
China 4593 3297 1054 703.2
Colombia 109 47 15 3.7
Ecuador 49 21 11 1.4
Honduras 45 27 11 0.8
India 2795 1186 402 162.4
Indonesia 214 114 27 7.5
Israel 50 32 11 2.6
Malaysia 223 138 29 4.1
Mexico 295 172 55 18.4
Peru 73 49 12 2.2
South Africa 94 33 10 5.2
















Thailand 220 97 22 2.0
Vietnam 285 219 31 7.6
Type Project types < 10 iss 432 192 37 14.9
Biomass energy 1266 565 198 29.6
Cement 92 32 12 2.7
Coal bed/mine methane 139 73 29 17.8
EE industry 276 93 33 2.1
EE own generation 720 315 124 51.3
EE supply side 172 46 12 2.0
Fossil fuel switch 221 93 49 40.2
Fugitive 87 29 10 16.7
HFCs 24 23 19 472.3
Hydro 2683 1774 613 122.7
Landfill gas 511 311 104 33.2
Methane avoidance 980 538 158 13.4
N2O 112 96 50 236.7
Solar 401 211 12 0.2
Wind 2806 1948 523 98.4
Scale < 50 ktCO2e per yr 6130 3239 944 68.5
50-500 ktCO2e per yr 4465 2926 932 266.4
> 500 ktCO2e per yr 327 174 107 819.3
Table 3 shows a breakdown of project type for the five largest host countries.
It shows that the most common project type in China is hydro. It also shows
some interesting differences between China and India, including that biomass
projects are much more common in India, both in relative as well as absolute
terms.
Table 3. Breakdown of project type per host country for the five largest host coun-
tries, with threshold for merging categories set at 10 projects that have issued CERs.
Project type Number of projects that have started the GSP
China India Brazil Mexico Vietnam
Project types with < 10 iss 59 151 26 7 3
Biomass energy 191 569 153 18 18





Project type Number of projects that have started the GSP
China India Brazil Mexico Vietnam
Coal bed/mine methane 131 3 0 1 0
EE industry 19 186 6 10 2
EE own generation 423 211 13 2 5
EE supply side 37 68 4 2 0
Fossil fuel switch 44 78 16 1 0
Fugitive 4 16 7 2 1
HFCs 11 9 0 2 0
Hydro 1603 286 147 14 216
Landfill gas 134 47 71 37 7
Methane avoidance 115 79 93 158 28
N2O 50 9 5 3 0
Solar 160 136 1 0 0
Wind 1567 920 83 36 5
SUM 4593 2795 628 295 285
3 The analysis
This section is divided into four subsections. The first presents the concepts,
the second discusses model choice, the third shows the analysis, which relies on
the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator, and the fourth shows the analysis, which
relies on the Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) model.
3.1 Concepts
The starting point for analysing the time to market is the hazard of first
issuance h(d), and the decision of how to model it. h(d) is the instantaneous
probability that a CDM project issues the first CERs conditional on the fact
that the project has not issued any CERs before. h(d) is a function of duration
days d from the start of the GSP.
Because h(d) shows the instantaneous probability it is not very informative.
A more informative measure is the survival function, S(d), which gives the
probability that a project has not issued any CERs as a function of duration
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d.23 As shown in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), p. 577), S(d) is obtained by















The analysis relies on two estimators, the KM estimator and the CPH model.
The KM estimator is used to answer the first question presented in Section 1,
while the CPH model is used to answer the second. Both the KM estimator
and the CPH model are chosen because of their generality. They are possibly
the least restrictive models in their respective classes of nonparametric and
parametric models for censored survival data. The disadvantage of the KM
estimator is that it cannot accommodate covariates, hence the need for a
second model, the CPH model, which can.
Although the KM estimator cannot accommodate covariates, what can be
done using it (as in Appendix A) is to split the population of projects into
subpopulations and estimate the probability distribution of the time to market
separately for each. The disadvantage of this approach is that the probability
distribution of small subpopulations cannot be estimated reliably, which makes
comparisons of any but the largest subpopulations meaningless.
In terms of generality, the difference between the KM estimator and the CPH
model is that the KM estimator makes no assumption of the functional form
of hazard h(d), while the CPH model assumes that the hazard, conditional on
covariates x, can be factored into two separate functions,
h(d|x) = h0(d)φ(x,β) (3)
where h0(d), which depends on d alone, can take any form, and φ(x,β), which
depends on x alone, is assumed to take a parametric form. h0(d) is known
as the baseline hazard. Usually, φ(x,β) = exp(xTβ), which is followed here
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 591).
The great advantage of this formulation is that the baseline hazard h0(d) can
take any form. An alternative formulation would assume a specific functional
23The term survival originates from clinical studies and refers to the state of the
patient being alive, from which the exit is marked by the event of death. Here,
survival refers to the state of non-issuance, from which the exit is marked by the
event of first issuance.
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form for h0(d), which would obviously be much more restrictive. The limita-
tion imposed by this formulation is that the regression coefficients β must be
constant over duration d. This is known as the proportionality assumption.
It says that the hazard of one project must be proportional to the hazard of
any other project.
A very convenient consequence of the proportionality assumption is that the
ratio of two hazards, known as the hazard ratio, is constant over duration
because the baseline hazards h0(d) cancel out. For this reason, the regression
results of CPH models are usually presented in terms of hazard ratios. This
convention is followed here. Because all the covariates used in the analysis are
categorical, the hazard ratios are expressed in terms of the included category
relative to the excluded category. A hazard ratio that is larger than one
shows that a project from the included category has a larger hazard of first
issuance than a project from the excluded category. Integrated over duration,
this translates into a shorter time to market for a project from the included
category.
3.3 The KM estimator
This subsection answers the question of the distribution of the time to market
across all projects that started the GSP in 2003-2012. The answer relies on
the KM estimator.
Without censoring, a natural candidate for the estimator of the hazard of
first issuance h(d) is the number of first issuances observed at d days from GSP
start divided by the number of projects that were at risk of first issuance, i.e.
projects that had not issued any CERs before d. The KM estimator extends





where fd is the number of first issuances observed at d and rd− is the number
of projects at risk of first issuance just before d. A project is said to be at
risk of first issuance if it has not issued any CERs or has not been censored;
e.g. a project that is censored at d = 100 days is not part of the risk set at
d− = 101 days.
Estimating ĥ(d) at each d, where at least one project is known to have issued
the first CERs, produces a range of estimates of h at different d. Integrating
these estimates over d gives the S(d) shown in Figure 3.24 For comparison,
Figure 4 shows the probability that a project has not requested registration as
24The estimation is done using the functions Surv and survfit in the package survival
(version 2.37-4) written by Terry Therneau for R. The R version is 3.0.2.
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Figure 3. Time to market of all projects that started the GSP in 2003-2012. The
solid line shows S(d), the probability that a project from this population has not
issued CERs as a function of days d from GSP start. The dotted lines demarcate the
95% confidence interval of S(d).
























Figure 4. Time to request for registration of all projects that started the GSP in
2003-2012. The solid line shows the probability that a project from this population
has not submitted a request for registration as a function of days d from GSP start.
a function of days d from GSP start. The process for producing it is identical
to the process for producing Figure 3, with the hazard of first issuance replaced
by the hazard of request for registration.
Two observations can be made based on Figures 3 and 4. First, between GSP
start and request for registration, 30% of all projects fail, while another 20%
fail between request for registration and first issuance. In other words, half
of all CDM projects that start the GSP will never issue any CERs. Second,
for the other 50% of all projects, the median time to market, defined as the




This subsection answers the question of how the time to market depends on
host country, the technology on which a project relies, the scale of the project,
and time. The answer relies on the CPH model. The specification of the model
is developed in steps to highlight the choices made at each step. Table 4 shows
the specifications that make up the narrative of this subsection.























1a First iss. x x x 25 projects
1b First iss. x x x m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} 10 projects
2a First iss. x x x x m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} 25 projects
2b First iss. x x x x m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} 25 projects
3a First iss. x x x x x m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} 25 projects
3b First iss. x x x x x m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} 10 projects
3c Reg. req. x x x x x m2 = 1{d ≥ 250 days} 25 projects
Notes: In Specification 2b, the scale of the project, defined as expected yearly emissions
reduction, enters the regression directly as a continuous variable. In all other specifications,
the scale enters the regression as a categorized variable.
3.4.1 Specifications 1a and 1b
The starting point for the analysis is Specification 1a, which has only constant
covariates, i.e. covariates that do not vary over duration d or time t,
h(d) = h0(d) exp(x
T
chrβchr), (5)
where xchr is a vector of dummies for project characteristics. xchr contains
dummies for host country, project type, and scale. βchr is a vector of regression
coefficient.
Table 5 shows the estimation results for Specification 1a.25 A regression
cannot include dummies for all categories; one category must be omitted. The
excluded categories are China for host country, hydro power for project type,




and less than 50 ktCO2e per year for the scale of the project.
26 The excluded
categories are the reference against which the hazard ratios of the categories
that are included in the regression are interpreted.
Table 5. Regression results for Specification 1a, where the dependent variable is the
hazard of first issuance. One category of each independent variable is excluded from
the regression.
Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Host countries with < 25 iss -0.79 0.09 0.46 0.00
Brazil -0.31 0.10 0.73 0.00
Chile -0.28 0.20 0.75 0.15
India -0.64 0.07 0.53 0.00
Indonesia -0.68 0.20 0.51 0.00
Malaysia -1.02 0.20 0.36 0.00
Mexico -0.86 0.15 0.42 0.00
South Korea -0.23 0.19 0.79 0.22
Vietnam -0.35 0.18 0.71 0.06
Type Project types with < 25 iss -0.42 0.11 0.65 0.00
Biomass energy -0.32 0.09 0.73 0.00
Coal bed/mine methane -0.59 0.19 0.55 0.00
EE industry -0.55 0.18 0.58 0.00
EE own generation -0.71 0.10 0.49 0.00
Fossil fuel switch -0.34 0.16 0.71 0.03
Landfill gas -0.04 0.11 0.96 0.72
Methane avoidance -0.15 0.11 0.86 0.15
N2O 0.55 0.15 1.73 0.00
Wind 0.55 0.06 1.73 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.34 0.05 1.40 0.00
> 500 ktCO2e per yr 1.22 0.11 3.40 0.00
Notes: The excluded categories are the reference relative to which the effects of the remain-
ing categories are interpreted. The excluded categories are China (for host country), hydro
power (for project type) and less than 50 ktCO2e per year in expected emissions reduction
(for project scale). Exp(coeff.) is the hazard ratio. The hazard ratio shows the hazard (of
first issuance) of the included category relative to excluded category, e.g. the hazard of first
issuance of a project hosted by India relative to a project hosted by China. The p-value
shows the probability of the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one, i.e. that a
project hosted by India has the same hazard of first issuance as a project hosted by China.
In Specification 1a, the threshold for merging categories is 25 projects. Cate-
26China is chosen as the excluded category for host country because it is the most
common host country. Hydro is chosen as the excluded category for project type
because hydro is the most common project type in China. The choice of excluded
categories does not affect the results.
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gories of host countries and project types with less than 25 projects are merged
and relabelled as hosts with less than 25 issuances (iss) and types with less
than 25 iss, respectively. For example, there are only 19 HFCs projects that
have issued CERs. Thus, HFCs projects fall into the category of types with less
than 25 iss. Without a threshold, the model would include dummies with ex-
tremely few observations, which would make estimation unreliable. Arguably,
the choice of threshold is somewhat arbitrary.
For comparison, in Specification 1b, the threshold for merging categories
is lowered from 25 to 10 projects. Table 6 shows the estimation results for
Specification 1b. Lowering the threshold brings new dummies into the esti-
mation, among others, a dummy for HFCs. However, the standard errors of
the regression coefficients for the new dummies are much larger than for the
original set of dummies due to the low number of observations.27 Thus, the
regression coefficients of the new dummies must either be very small or very
large for them to be statistically significant.
Table 6. Regression results for Specification 1b, which is identical to Specification
1a but has threshold of 10 projects instead of 25 projects for merging categories.
Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Host countries < 10 iss -1.07 0.12 0.34 0.00
LDCs -1.00 0.32 0.37 0.00
Argentina -0.20 0.29 0.82 0.48
Brazil -0.30 0.10 0.74 0.00
Chile -0.27 0.20 0.76 0.17
Colombia -0.43 0.26 0.65 0.10
Ecuador 0.04 0.30 1.04 0.89
Honduras -0.14 0.31 0.87 0.64
India -0.64 0.07 0.53 0.00
Indonesia -0.67 0.20 0.51 0.00
Israel -0.44 0.31 0.64 0.15
Malaysia -1.02 0.20 0.36 0.00
Mexico -0.93 0.15 0.40 0.00
Peru -0.46 0.29 0.63 0.11
South Africa -0.60 0.32 0.55 0.06
South Korea -0.26 0.19 0.77 0.18
Thailand -0.80 0.23 0.45 0.00
Vietnam -0.34 0.18 0.71 0.06
Type Project types with < 10 iss -0.49 0.17 0.61 0.00
continued
27Lowering the threshold introduces 14 new dummies into the regression, most of
which show a non-significant coefficient, i.e. a p-value > 0.05 for the null hypothesis




Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Biomass energy -0.33 0.09 0.72 0.00
Cement -0.69 0.29 0.50 0.02
Coal bed/mine methane -0.57 0.19 0.56 0.00
EE industry -0.55 0.18 0.57 0.00
EE own generation -0.71 0.10 0.49 0.00
EE supply side -0.91 0.30 0.40 0.00
Fossil fuel switch -0.31 0.16 0.73 0.05
Fugitive -0.57 0.32 0.57 0.08
HFCs 1.71 0.25 5.52 0.00
Landfill gas -0.04 0.11 0.96 0.70
Methane avoidance -0.13 0.11 0.88 0.22
N2O 0.57 0.15 1.77 0.00
Solar -0.27 0.30 0.76 0.36
Wind 0.56 0.06 1.75 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.34 0.05 1.41 0.00
More than 500 ktCO2e per yr 1.13 0.12 3.10 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the hazard of first issuance. The excluded categories of
the independent variables are China (for host country), hydro power (for project type), and
less than 50 ktCO2e per year in expected emissions reduction (for project scale). Dummies
that are introduced as a result of lowering the threshold from 25 projects to 10 projects are
shown in red color. The threshold is defined in terms of the number of projects that have
issued CERs.
The regression results are presented in terms of the hazard ratio of the
included category relative to the excluded category. The hazard ratio is equal
to the exponent of the regression coefficient of the included category; e.g.
for wind relative to hydro the hazard ratio is equal to the exponent of the









exp(βwind · 0) = exp(βwind), (6)
where x−chr contains the same dummies as xchr expect for the dummy for
the category of wind power. h0(d) and exp(x
T
−chrβ−chr) cancel out as a con-
sequence of the proportionality assumption. Specification 1a (Table 5) gives
exp(βwind) = 1.73, which suggests that wind power projects move faster from
GSP start to first issuance than hydro power projects.
However, Appendix B shows that Specification 1a does not satisfy the pro-
portionality assumption; i.e. there are pairs of projects for which the hazard




3.4.2 Specifications 2a and 2b
To correct the violation of the proportionality assumption, interactions be-
tween the covariates and a dummy m1 = 1{d ≥ dthres} for duration length are
introduced in Specification 2a, which is defined as
h(d) = h0(d) exp(x
T
chrβchr + (m1× xchr)Tγchr), (7)
where xTchrβchr shows the main effects, and (m1 × xchr)Tγchr shows the in-
teraction effects. Compared with Specification 1a, which only has constant
covariates, the dummy m1 in Specification 2a varies over duration. Appendix
B confirms that Specification 2a does not violate the proportionality assump-
tion. The threshold dthres is set at 3 years. The choice of threshold is guided
by the test statistic.29
The procedure for introducing the interactions is the simplest possible. Each
duration that exceeds 3 years is split into two parts, [0 days, 3 years] and [3
years, dend], where dend is the end of the duration.
30 The dummy m1 (m for
mature) has the value 0 for [0 days, 3 years] and the value 1 for [3 years,
dend].31 The procedure is illustrated in Figure 5. Dur. 1 is split into [0, 3
years] and [3 years, 4 years]. Dur. 2 is not split, because dend < 3 years.
Dur 3. is censored at the censoring date, which is 1 January 2013. However,
because Dur. 3 is at least 6 years, it is split in [0, 3] and [3, 6+], where the
plus sign indicates censoring.
Table 7 shows the estimation results for Specification 2a. The estimation is
done using the same statistical package as the estimation of Specification 1a.
Due to the interactions, the interpretation of results is not as straightforward
as in Specification 1a. Given that dummy m1 is defined as m1 = 1{d ≥
28For example, landfill gas projects face more complex monitoring and verification
requirements than hydro power projects, among others, because the methane content
of the landfill gas must be monitored continuously. This is likely to add further delay
to landfill gas projects, which will show up as differences in the shape of the hazard
functions, and trigger a violation of the proportionality assumption.
29A specification with a threshold much below 3 years does not correct the violation of
the proportionality assumption. The same applies for a specification with a threshold
much above 3 years.
30For uncensored projects, i.e. projects that have issued CERs, dend is the number of
days between GSP start and first issuance. For censored projects, i.e. projects that
have not (yet) issued CERs, dend is the number of days between GSP start and the
censoring date, which is 1 January 2013.




Figure 5. Procedure for introducing interactions between the covariates and a
dummy for duration length in Specification 2a.
3 years}, the main effect shows the hazard ratio for d less than 3 years while
the sum of the main effect and the interaction effect shows the hazard ratio for
d of more than 3 years. For example, the hazard ratio of wind power relative to
hydro power is exp(0.66) = 1.94 for d less than 3 years and exp(0.66−0.13) =
1.70 for d more than 3 years.32 For this particular effect, the qualitative result
is the same as in Specification 1a. Wind power projects move faster from GSP
start to first issuance than hydro power projects.
Table 7. Regression results for Specification 2a, where the dependent variable is the
hazard of first issuance and one category of each independent variable is excluded
from the regression.
Host Host countries with < 25 iss -0.49 0.13 0.61 0.00
Brazil 0.37 0.13 1.45 0.00
Chile 0.31 0.25 1.37 0.21
India -0.39 0.10 0.67 0.00
Indonesia -1.15 0.42 0.32 0.01
Malaysia -1.21 0.39 0.30 0.00
Mexico -0.36 0.23 0.70 0.12
South Korea -0.34 0.31 0.71 0.27
Vietnam -1.00 0.38 0.37 0.01
Type Project types with < 25 iss -0.29 0.16 0.75 0.08
Biomass energy 0.21 0.12 1.23 0.09
Coal bed/mine methane -0.82 0.36 0.44 0.02
EE industry 0.27 0.23 1.31 0.24
EE own generation -0.52 0.16 0.59 0.00
Fossil fuel switch 0.03 0.21 1.03 0.88
Landfill gas -0.05 0.18 0.96 0.80
continued
32The intuition for why the hazard ratio changes over duration is that the hazard




Methane avoidance -0.16 0.17 0.85 0.33
N2O 0.65 0.23 1.92 0.00
Wind 0.66 0.10 1.94 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.35 0.08 1.42 0.00




m1:Hosts with < 25 iss -0.58 0.17 0.56 0.00
m1:Brazil -1.36 0.20 0.26 0.00
m1:Chile -1.26 0.41 0.28 0.00
m1:India -0.48 0.14 0.62 0.00
m1:Indonesia 0.60 0.48 1.83 0.21
m1:Malaysia 0.17 0.46 1.19 0.71
m1:Mexico -0.91 0.31 0.40 0.00
m1:South Korea 0.11 0.39 1.11 0.78
m1:Vietnam 1.01 0.44 2.74 0.02
. . . and
project
type
m1:Types with < 25 iss -0.20 0.23 0.82 0.38
m1:Biomass energy -0.95 0.18 0.39 0.00
m1:Coal bed/mine methane 0.30 0.43 1.35 0.48
m1:EE industry -1.64 0.40 0.19 0.00
m1:EE own generation -0.32 0.20 0.72 0.11
m1:Fossil fuel switch -0.65 0.31 0.52 0.04
m1:Landfill gas 0.01 0.23 1.01 0.96
m1:Methane avoidance 0.06 0.22 1.06 0.80
m1:N2O -0.21 0.30 0.81 0.49
m1:Wind -0.13 0.13 0.88 0.34
. . . and
size
m1:50-500 ktCO2e per yr -0.02 0.11 0.98 0.85
m1:> 500 ktCO2e per yr -0.45 0.23 0.64 0.05
Notes: The excluded categories are the reference, relative to which the effects of the re-
maining categories are interpreted. The excluded categories are China (for host coun-
try), hydro power (for project type), and less than 50 ktCO2e per year in expected emis-
sions reduction (for project scale). Durations that exceed 3 years are split into two parts,
m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years}.
Scale is split, somewhat arbitrarily, into three categories: less than 50
ktCO2e per year, between 50 and 500 ktCO2e per year and above 500 ktCO2e
per year. For comparison, Specification 2b shows how the results change if
expected yearly emissions reduction enters the regression as a continuous vari-
able. The estimation results for Specification 2b are shown in Table 8. The




Table 8. Regression results for Specification 2b, which is same as Specification 2a
expect that the scale, in terms of expected yearly emissions reductions in ktCO2e,
enters the regression directly.
Covar. Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Hosts with < 25 iss -0.59 0.13 0.56 0.00
Brazil 0.23 0.13 1.26 0.07
Chile 0.22 0.25 1.25 0.38
India -0.60 0.09 0.55 0.00
Indonesia -1.23 0.42 0.29 0.00
Malaysia -1.29 0.39 0.28 0.00
Mexico -0.43 0.23 0.65 0.07
South Korea -0.49 0.31 0.61 0.11
Vietnam -1.10 0.38 0.33 0.00
Type Types with < 25 iss -0.22 0.16 0.81 0.18
Biomass energy 0.24 0.12 1.27 0.05
Coal bed/mine methane -1.23 0.43 0.29 0.00
EE industry 0.28 0.23 1.32 0.23
EE own generation -0.47 0.16 0.63 0.00
Fossil fuel switch 0.39 0.21 1.47 0.06
Landfill gas 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.99
Methane avoidance -0.25 0.17 0.78 0.13
N2O 0.82 0.23 2.27 0.00
Wind 0.75 0.09 2.12 0.00




m1:Hosts with < 25 iss -0.56 0.17 0.57 0.00
m1:Brazil -1.32 0.20 0.27 0.00
m1:Chile -1.26 0.41 0.28 0.00
m1:India -0.44 0.13 0.65 0.00
m1:Indonesia 0.61 0.48 1.85 0.20
m1:Malaysia 0.19 0.46 1.22 0.67
m1:Mexico -0.92 0.31 0.40 0.00
m1:South Korea 0.09 0.39 1.09 0.81
m1:Vietnam 1.07 0.44 2.90 0.01
. . . project
type
m1:Types with < 25 iss -0.22 0.22 0.80 0.33
m1:Biomass energy -0.92 0.18 0.40 0.00
m1:Coal bed/mine meth. 0.76 0.49 2.13 0.12
m1:EE industry -1.63 0.40 0.20 0.00
m1:EE own generation -0.30 0.20 0.74 0.14
m1:Fossil fuel switch -0.81 0.30 0.44 0.01
m1:Landfill gas 0.04 0.23 1.04 0.87
m1:Methane avoidance 0.10 0.22 1.10 0.65
m1:N2O -0.18 0.30 0.84 0.55





Covar. Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
. . . scale m1:ktCO2e per yr 0.00002 0.00007 1.00002 0.77
Notes: The dependent variable is the hazard of first issuance. With the exception of scale,
the independent variables are categorical. The excluded categories are China (for host coun-
try) and hydro power (for project type). Durations that exceed 3 years are split into two
parts, m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years}.
A third variation of Specification 2a replaces the three categories for project
scale with a dummy for large-scale methodology. The complete estimation
results of this third variation are omitted to save space. The omitted results
show that a project that applies a large-scale methodology has a hazard of
first issuance of 1.92 for d less than 3 years and 1.28 for d more than 3 years
compared with a project that applies a small-scale methodology.
3.4.3 Specifications 3a, 3b, and 3c
Finally, to quantify how the hazard of first issuance changes over time, dum-
mies for period are introduced in Specification 3a, which is defined as
h(d) = h0(d) exp
{
xTchrβchr + (m1× xchr)Tγchr




Time is split, somewhat arbitrarily, into three periods: Jan01-Dec07, Jan08-
Dec09, and Jan10-Dec12. The dummy for the period Jan08-Dec09 is excluded
from the regression. xper contains dummies for the remaining two, a dummy
for Jan01-Dec07 and a dummy for Jan10-Dec12.
Compared with Specification 1a, which has only constant covariates, Spec-
ification 3a has variables that vary over both duration d and time t. Time
is treated in an identical way to the other covariates. Thus, Specification 3a
contains interactions between m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years} and the dummies xper.
Appendix B confirms that Specification 3a does not violate the proportionality
assumption.
The procedure for introducing the dummies for period is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6. The single duration that runs from 2006 to 2012+ is split in three points
in time, twice where the period changes and once where the duration exceeds
the threshold of 3 years.33
Table 9 shows the estimation results for Specification 3a. The inclusion of
time provides for some new insights. The estimates show that in Jan10-Dec12
33The split is done using a custom piece of R code.
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Figure 6. Procedure for introducing the dummies for period in Specification 3a.
the hazard of first issuance was exp(−0.80) = 0.45 for d less than 3 years and
exp(−0.80 + 0.43) = 0.70 for d more than 3 years, compared with the period
Jan08-Dec09. The main effect (Jan10-Dec12) shows the hazard ratio for d
less than 3 years, while the sum of the main effect (Jan10-Dec12) and the
interaction effect (m1:Jan10-Dec12) shows the hazard ratio for d more than 3
years.34
Table 9. Regression results for Specification 3a, where the dependent variable is the
hazard of first issuance, and one category of each independent variable is excluded
from the regression.
Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Hosts with < 25 iss -1.10 0.13 0.33 0.00
Brazil -0.41 0.14 0.66 0.00
Chile -0.39 0.26 0.68 0.13
India -0.80 0.10 0.45 0.00
Indonesia -1.34 0.42 0.26 0.00
Malaysia -1.55 0.39 0.21 0.00
Mexico -1.11 0.24 0.33 0.00
South Korea -0.90 0.31 0.41 0.00
Vietnam -1.04 0.39 0.35 0.01
Type Types with < 25 iss -0.25 0.16 0.78 0.13
Biomass energy 0.06 0.12 1.06 0.63
continued
34Table 9 shows that the coefficient is positive (2.48) for the dummy Jan01-Dec07
but negative (-2.15) for the interaction m1:Jan01-Dec07. Taking the exponent of the
coefficient for Jan01-Dec07 shows that a project with a duration (between GSP start
and first issuance) of less than 3 years had a hazard (of first issuance) of 11.97 in
Jan01-Dec07 relative to a similar project in Jan08-Dec09. Taking the exponents of
the sum of coefficients for Jan01-Dec07 and m1:Jan01-Dec07 shows that a project
with a duration of more than 3 years had a hazard of 1.39 in Jan01-Dec07 compared
with a similar project in Jan08-Dec09. The intuition is that, between Jan01-Dec07
and Jan08-Dec09, delays increased a lot and, as a result, the share of projects that




Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Coal bed/mine methane -0.95 0.36 0.39 0.01
EE industry 0.05 0.23 1.06 0.81
EE own generation -0.52 0.16 0.59 0.00
Fossil fuel switch -0.15 0.21 0.86 0.48
Landfill gas -0.51 0.18 0.60 0.00
Methane avoidance -0.19 0.17 0.82 0.25
N2O 0.63 0.23 1.87 0.01
Wind 0.80 0.09 2.22 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.33 0.08 1.39 0.00
> 500 ktCO2e per yr 1.43 0.15 4.17 0.00
Period Jan01-Dec07 2.48 0.10 11.97 0.00




m1:Hosts with < 25 iss -0.01 0.18 0.99 0.93
m1:Brazil -0.63 0.21 0.53 0.00
m1:Chile -0.60 0.41 0.55 0.15
m1:India -0.11 0.14 0.90 0.44
m1:Indonesia 0.78 0.48 2.19 0.10
m1:Malaysia 0.50 0.46 1.65 0.27
m1:Mexico -0.21 0.31 0.81 0.50
m1:South Korea 0.64 0.39 1.90 0.10
m1:Vietnam 1.04 0.44 2.84 0.02
. . . and
project
type
m1:Types with < 25 iss -0.25 0.23 0.78 0.27
m1:Biomass energy -0.81 0.18 0.45 0.00
m1:Coal bed/mine methane 0.41 0.43 1.51 0.33
m1:EE industry -1.44 0.40 0.24 0.00
m1:EE own generation -0.32 0.21 0.72 0.12
m1:Fossil fuel switch -0.48 0.31 0.62 0.13
m1:Landfill gas 0.46 0.23 1.58 0.05
m1:Methane avoidance 0.09 0.22 1.09 0.69
m1:N2O -0.17 0.31 0.85 0.58
m1:Wind -0.26 0.13 0.77 0.05
. . . and
size
m1:50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.00 0.11 1.00 0.99
m1:> 500 ktCO2e per yr -0.43 0.23 0.65 0.06
. . . and pe-
riod
m1:Jan01-Dec07 -2.15 0.73 0.12 0.00
m1:Jan10-Dec12 0.43 0.15 1.54 0.01
Notes: The excluded categories are the reference, relative to which the effects of the remain-
ing categories are interpreted. The excluded categories are China (for host country), hydro
power (for project type), less than 50 ktCO2e per year in expected emissions reduction (for
project scale), and Jan08-Dec09 (for period). Durations that exceed 3 years are split into
two parts, m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years}.
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Thus, in the period Jan10-Dec12, first issuance was less likely than in the
period that preceded it, regardless of how many days or years a project had
spent in the CDM project cycle. Given the somewhat artificial split of time,
Section 4 presents two variations of Specification 3a, one in which the split
point between the second and third period is shifted 6 months forward in time
and another where it is shifted 12 months forward.
Specification 3a relies on the same threshold for merging categories as Spec-
ification 1a. For comparison, in Specification 3b the threshold for merging
categories is lowered from 25 projects to 10. Table 10 shows the estimation re-
sults for Specification 3b. As in moving from Specification 1a to Specification
1b, lowering the threshold brings new dummies into the estimation.
Table 10. Regression results for Specification 3b, which is identical to Specification
3a but has a threshold of 10 projects instead of 25 projects for merging categories.
Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Hosts with < 10 iss -1.42 0.19 0.24 0.00
LDCs -2.02 0.71 0.13 0.00
Argentina -0.68 0.42 0.51 0.10
Brazil -0.39 0.14 0.67 0.00
Chile -0.36 0.26 0.70 0.17
Colombia -0.51 0.38 0.60 0.19
Ecuador -0.13 0.36 0.88 0.72
Honduras -1.10 0.42 0.33 0.01
India -0.82 0.10 0.44 0.00
Indonesia -1.32 0.42 0.27 0.00
Israel -0.03 0.39 0.97 0.94
Malaysia -1.54 0.39 0.21 0.00
Mexico -1.11 0.24 0.33 0.00
Peru -0.81 0.45 0.45 0.08
South Africa -1.02 0.46 0.36 0.03
South Korea -0.98 0.31 0.38 0.00
Thailand -1.00 0.37 0.37 0.01
Vietnam -0.95 0.39 0.39 0.01
Type Types with < 10 iss -0.32 0.28 0.72 0.25
Biomass energy 0.08 0.13 1.08 0.52
Cement -0.20 0.36 0.82 0.57
Coal bed/mine methane -0.87 0.36 0.42 0.02
EE industry 0.07 0.23 1.08 0.75
EE own generation -0.48 0.16 0.62 0.00
EE supply side -0.32 0.39 0.73 0.41
Fossil fuel switch -0.08 0.22 0.92 0.71





Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
HFCs 0.83 0.30 2.29 0.01
Landfill gas -0.50 0.18 0.61 0.01
Methane avoidance -0.18 0.17 0.84 0.30
N2O 0.69 0.23 1.99 0.00
Solar -0.03 0.30 0.97 0.93
Wind 0.84 0.10 2.32 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.30 0.08 1.35 0.00
> 500 ktCO2e per yr 1.25 0.17 3.49 0.00
Period Jan01-Dec07 2.47 0.10 11.81 0.00




m1:Hosts with < 10 iss 0.03 0.25 1.03 0.91
m1:LDCs 1.11 0.80 3.03 0.17
m1:Argentina 0.49 0.57 1.63 0.40
m1:Brazil -0.63 0.21 0.53 0.00
m1:Chile -0.61 0.41 0.54 0.14
m1:Colombia -0.13 0.53 0.88 0.81
m1:Ecuador -0.77 0.68 0.46 0.26
m1:Honduras 0.44 0.62 1.55 0.48
m1:India -0.06 0.14 0.94 0.68
m1:Indonesia 0.80 0.48 2.22 0.10
m1:Israel -1.02 0.64 0.36 0.11
m1:Malaysia 0.52 0.46 1.69 0.26
m1:Mexico -0.21 0.31 0.81 0.50
m1:Peru 0.07 0.59 1.07 0.91
m1:South Africa -0.01 0.65 0.99 0.99
m1:South Korea 0.66 0.39 1.94 0.09
m1:Thailand 0.09 0.47 1.09 0.86
m1:Vietnam 0.95 0.44 2.59 0.03
. . . and
project
type
m1:Types with < 10 iss 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.99
m1:Biomass energy -0.88 0.18 0.42 0.00
m1:Cement -1.25 0.62 0.29 0.04
m1:Coal bed/mine methane 0.32 0.43 1.38 0.46
m1:EE industry -1.50 0.40 0.22 0.00
m1:EE own generation -0.38 0.21 0.68 0.06
m1:EE supply side -0.91 0.60 0.40 0.13
m1:Fossil fuel switch -0.58 0.32 0.56 0.07
m1:Fugitive -0.34 0.65 0.71 0.60
m1:HFCs 0.00 0.78 1.00 1.00
m1:Landfill gas 0.41 0.23 1.51 0.07
m1:Methane avoidance 0.06 0.22 1.06 0.80





Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
m1:Solar omitted from the regression
m1:Wind -0.31 0.13 0.73 0.02
. . . and
size
m1:50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.05 0.11 1.06 0.61
m1:> 500 ktCO2e per yr -0.22 0.24 0.80 0.37
. . . and pe-
riod
m1:Jan01-Dec07 -2.17 0.73 0.11 0.00
m1:Jan10-Dec12 0.40 0.16 1.49 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is the hazard of first issuance. The excluded categories are
China (for host country), hydro power (for project type), less than 50 ktCO2e per year in
expected emissions reduction (for project scale), and Jan08-Dec09 (for period). Durations
that exceed 3 years are split into two parts, m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years}. Dummies that are intro-
duced as a result of lowering the threshold from 25 projects to 10 projects are shown in red
color. To make sure the model converges, the interaction m1:Solar is omitted. In the data,
there is not a single solar project with a time to market of less than 3 years.
Specification 3c is identical to Specification 3a, except the hazard of first
issuance is replaced by the hazard of request for registration. Table 11 shows
the estimation results for Specification 3c.35 Interestingly, it shows that, com-
pared with Jan08-Dec09, in Jan10-Dec12 the hazard of requesting registration
was exp(0.86) = 2.37 for d less than 250 days exp(0.86 − 0.68) = 1.20 for d
more than 3 years. Thus, in the period Jan10-Dec12, request for registration
was more likely than in the period that preceded it.
Table 11. Regression results for Specification 3c, which is identical to Specification
3a but the dependent variable is the hazard of requesting registration instead of the
hazard of first issuance.
Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Host Hosts with < 25 iss -0.67 0.08 0.51 0.00
Brazil -1.21 0.13 0.30 0.00
Chile -0.60 0.21 0.55 0.00
India -1.17 0.07 0.31 0.00
Indonesia -0.40 0.18 0.67 0.03
Malaysia -0.29 0.18 0.75 0.10
Mexico 0.26 0.11 1.30 0.02
South Korea -0.05 0.16 0.95 0.74
Vietnam -0.32 0.17 0.72 0.06
continued
35Because the typical duration from GSP start to request for registration is much
shorter than the duration from GSP start to first issuance, the threshold dthres is set




Covariate Dummy Coeff. SE of coeff. Exp(coeff.) p-value
Type Types with < 25 iss 0.65 0.09 1.92 0.00
Biomass energy 0.38 0.09 1.47 0.00
Coal bed/mine methane -0.83 0.28 0.44 0.00
EE industry 0.12 0.19 1.13 0.53
EE own generation -0.37 0.13 0.69 0.00
Fossil fuel switch 0.20 0.19 1.22 0.29
Landfill gas 0.35 0.12 1.41 0.00
Methane avoidance 0.19 0.11 1.21 0.07
N2O 0.96 0.16 2.62 0.00
Wind 1.01 0.07 2.74 0.00
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr -0.02 0.06 0.98 0.72
> 500 ktCO2e per yr -0.07 0.14 0.93 0.60
Period Jan01-Dec07 1.74 0.08 5.71 0.00




m2:Hosts < 25 iss 0.07 0.09 1.07 0.45
m2:Brazil 0.47 0.15 1.60 0.00
m2:Chile 0.12 0.25 1.13 0.64
m2:India 0.29 0.09 1.34 0.00
m2:Indonesia 0.08 0.21 1.08 0.71
m2:Malaysia 0.12 0.21 1.13 0.56
m2:Mexico -1.29 0.17 0.28 0.00
m2:South Korea -0.04 0.22 0.96 0.85
m2:Vietnam 0.54 0.19 1.71 0.00
. . . and
project
type
m2:Types < 25 iss -0.99 0.11 0.37 0.00
m2:Biomass energy -0.91 0.11 0.40 0.00
m2:Coal bed/mine methane 0.26 0.31 1.29 0.41
m2:EE industry -0.89 0.23 0.41 0.00
m2:EE own generation -0.49 0.14 0.61 0.00
m2:Fossil fuel switch -0.86 0.23 0.42 0.00
m2:Landfill gas -0.41 0.14 0.67 0.00
m2:Methane avoidance -0.43 0.12 0.65 0.00
m2:N2O 0.02 0.22 1.02 0.92
m2:Wind -0.57 0.08 0.57 0.00
. . . and
size
m2:50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.14 0.07 1.15 0.03
m2:> 500 ktCO2e per yr 0.20 0.17 1.22 0.25
. . . and pe-
riod
m2:Jan01-Dec07 -1.05 0.10 0.35 0.00
m2:Jan10-Dec12 -0.68 0.08 0.51 0.00
Notes: One category of each independent variable is excluded from the regression. The ex-
cluded categories are China (for host country), hydro power (for project type), less than 50
ktCO2e per year in expected emissions reduction (for project scale), and Jan08-Dec09 (for
period). Durations that exceed 250 days are split into two parts, m2 = 1{d ≥ 250 days}.
As the typical duration from GSP start to request for registration is much shorter than the




This section presents and discusses the results. It is split into five subsections.
The first discusses the robustness of the results over different specifications.
The remaining subsections discuss specific results, with respect to host coun-
try, project type, scale, and time.
4.1 Robustness
A comparison of the regression results shows that lowering the threshold for
merging categories brings new dummies into the regression, in moving from
Specification 1a (Table 5) to Specification 1b (Table 6) and from Specification
3a (Table 9) to Specification 3b (Table 10). Lowering the threshold has a
negligible effect on the coefficient of the existing dummies, but changes the
coefficients of the ”residual” categories that contain the projects that fall below
the threshold.
Introducing interactions between the covariates and a dummy for duration
length, in moving from Specification 1a (Table 5) to Specification 2a (Table 7),
changes the structure of the results. In Specification 1a there is one hazard
ratio for each category, but in Specification 2a there are two hazard ratios for
each category, one for duration less than 3 years and one for duration more
than 3 years. In this sense, Specification 2a gives a more detailed picture.
In addition, Specification 2a satisfies the proportionality assumption, whereas
Specification 1a does not. Not satisfying the proportionality assumption makes
the results of Specification 1a susceptible to bias.
As a consequence of introducing period dummies, in moving from Specifica-
tion 2a (Table 7) to Specification 3a (Table 9), all coefficients change, some
more, others less. With a few exceptions (Brazil, Chile, and landfill gas), the
qualitative results are unchanged. The reason why the coefficients change is
that the distribution (of the project mass) over time varies across categories;
e.g. 17% of projects hosted by Brazil started the GSP before 2006, while
only 1% of the projects hosted by China did so. In Specification 2a, part of
this variation is captured by host-country dummies. In Specification 3a, this
variation is captured by period dummies. In this sense, Specification 3a is





To satisfy the proportionality assumption, Specifications 2a (Table 7) and 3a
(Table 9) include interactions between a dummy m1, for duration exceeding
3 years, and the covariates. In the presence of interactions, interpreting the
results is not as straightforward as in Specification 1a (Table 5) with no inter-
actions.
For example, what is the hazard ratio of a project hosted by India relative
to a similar project hosted by China? Specification 1a shows a hazard ratio of
0.53. In Specifications 2a and 3a there are two types of effects: main effects
and interactions effects. Given that m1 = 1{d ≥ 3 years}, the main effect
shows the hazard ratio for d less than 3 years while the sum of the main effect
and the interaction effect shows the hazard ratio for d more than 3 years. The
difference between Specification 2a and Specification 3a is that Specification 3a
controls for time. Specification 3a shows a hazard ratio of exp(−0.80) = 0.45
for d less than 3 years and hazard ratio of exp(−0.80−0.11) = 0.40 for d more
than 3 years. Integrated over duration, a hazard ratio of less than 1.0 shows
that a project hosted by India faces a longer time to market than an identical
project by China.
Table 12 shows these hazard ratios for d less than 3 years and d more than
3 years for all host countries, including India. Table 12 relies on Specifica-
tion 3b, because this Specification contains a more rich set of host countries
than Specification 3a. A number of observations can be made based on Ta-
ble 12. First, in terms of the hazard of first issuance, no country outperforms
China. Second, no statistically significant deviation is observed for Argentina,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Vietnam. Whether this is because of the large
standard errors or because these countries are on par with China is impossible
to say. Third, the remaining host countries underperform China. This follows
from the observation that they have a hazard ratio less than 1.0, either for d
less than 3 years or d more than 3 years, or both.
Table 12. Effect of host country on the hazard of first issuance, based on Specification
3b, where the excluded category is China (for host country).
Dummy for host country Duration d < 3 years Duration d ≥ 3 years
Hazard ratio p-value Hazard ratio p-value
Host countries < 10 iss 0.24 0.00 0.25 0.00
LDCs 0.13 0.00 0.40 0.01





Dummy for host country Duration d < 3 years Duration d ≥ 3 years
Hazard ratio p-value Hazard ratio p-value
Brazil 0.67 0.00 0.36 0.00
Chile 0.70 0.17 0.38 0.00
Colombia 0.60 0.19 0.53 0.08
Ecuador 0.88 0.72 0.41 0.12
Honduras 0.33 0.01 0.51 0.15
India 0.44 0.00 0.42 0.00
Indonesia 0.27 0.00 0.59 0.02
Israel 0.97 0.94 0.35 0.04
Malaysia 0.21 0.00 0.36 0.00
Mexico 0.33 0.00 0.27 0.00
Peru 0.45 0.08 0.48 0.05
South Africa 0.36 0.03 0.36 0.02
South Korea 0.38 0.00 0.73 0.18
Thailand 0.37 0.01 0.40 0.00
Vietnam 0.39 0.01 1.00 0.99
Notes: The hazard ratios are expressed relative to the excluded category. The p-value shows
the probability of the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one, i.e. that there is no
difference between a project from the included category and one from the excluded category.
The fact that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a subgroup of 49 coun-
tries, some of which are host to only one CDM project, show a very low hazard
of first issuance is noteworthy. Integrated over duration, this translates into a
very long time to market and high share of failed projects. Why are projects
hosted by LDCs at a disadvantage? Compared with China, projects hosted by
LDCs are likely to face additional hurdles, both along the CDM project cycle
and along the process of constructing and operating the underlying project.
Obtaining a Letter of Approval (LoA) from the government of an LDC that
may not have the processes in place for issuing LoAs may take more time than
obtaining an LoA from the government of China. Poor infrastructure may
also slow down construction, which will, given that CERs are issued ex post
based on monitored emissions reductions, show up as additional delay in the
time to market.
Table 12 shows that a project hosted by India has approximately half the
hazard of first issuance as that of an identical project hosted by China. This
provides some explanation of why the number of CERs issued to Chinese





Table 13 shows a similar comparison for project type. A number of observa-
tions can be made based on it. First, in terms of the hazard of first issuance,
the destruction of HFCs, decomposition of N2O, and wind power outperform
hydro power. Second, no statistically significant deviation is observed for the
(prevention of) fugitive emissions, methane emissions, and solar power. Third,
the remaining project types underperform hydro power.
Table 13. Effect of project type on the hazard of first issuance, based on Specification
3b, where the excluded category is hydro power (for project type).
Dummy for project type Duration d < 3 years Duration d ≥ 3 years
Hazard ratio p-value Hazard ratio p-value
Types < 10 iss 0.72 0.25 0.72 0.14
Biomass energy 1.08 0.52 0.45 0.00
Cement 0.82 0.57 0.23 0.00
Coal bed/mine methane 0.42 0.02 0.58 0.02
EE industry 1.08 0.75 0.24 0.00
EE own generation 0.62 0.00 0.42 0.00
EE supply side 0.73 0.41 0.29 0.01
Fossil fuel switch 0.92 0.71 0.52 0.00
Fugitive 0.60 0.27 0.43 0.06
HFCs 2.29 0.01 2.29 0.25
Landfill gas 0.61 0.01 0.92 0.55
Methane avoidance 0.84 0.30 0.89 0.39
N2O 1.99 0.00 1.56 0.03
Solar 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.93
Wind 2.32 0.00 1.69 0.00
Notes: The hazard ratios are expressed relative to the excluded category. The p-value shows
the probability of the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is equal to one, i.e. that there
is no difference between a project from the included category and one from the excluded
category, e.g. that methane avoidance projects are on par with hydro power projects.
An interesting observation that has been made in previous studies is that
the contribution of the CER revenue to the economic viability of a project
depends very much on project type. Au Yong (2009) and Giger (2012) define
the contribution of the CER revenue to the economic viability of a project as
the difference between the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) with and without
CER revenue.
According to Giger (2012), wind and hydro power projects lie at the low
end of the spectrum, with an IRR difference in the range of three to four
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percentage points, while coal bed/mine methane, landfill gas, and methane
avoidance projects lie at the high end, with an IRR difference in the range of
10 to 30 percentage points. Interestingly, Table 13 shows that project types
at the low end of the IRR difference spectrum exhibit a large hazard of first
issuance, while projects at the high end of the IRR difference spectrum exhibit
a low hazard of first issuance. This presents a challenge for the additionality
of projects in the market, because it shows that projects that do not rely on
the CER revenue for economic viability are the projects most likely to make
it to market.
Another noteworthy observation is that the highly contentious HFCs projects
have a very high hazard of first issuance. Schneider (2011) found that HCFC-
22 plants produced less HFC-23 during periods when no emission credits could
be claimed compared with periods during which HFC-23 destruction could be
credited under the CDM, which suggests that the claimed emission reductions
may not be additional.
4.3.1 Scale of the project
Regardless of how scale is defined, with expected yearly emission reduction
entering the regression as a categorical variable (Specifications 2a, 3a and
3b), as a continuous variable (Specification 2b), or as a dummy for large-scale
methodology, the result is the same - the larger the scale, the larger the hazard
of first issuance.
The small-scale methodologies contain a number of concessions when com-
pared with large-scale methodologies, such as allowing the same DOE to per-
form both the validation and the verification. Other things being equal, these
concessions should reduce the time to market. However, here, the finding is
the opposite. A likely explanation is that, because there is more at stake
in large-scale projects in terms of potential CER revenue, more effort is put
into pushing large projects through the CDM project cycle. The result shows
that the concessions have not been able to counterbalance the effect of this
additional effort.
Specifications 3a and 3b shows that projects that are expected to reduce
emission by more than 500 ktCO2e have a hazard between three and four
times as large as projects that are expected to reduce emission by less than
50 ktCO2e per year. This observation is noteworthy in the context of claims
that very large projects are unlikely to be additional. The argument goes that
large-infrastructure projects are typically part of strategic long-term plans of
governments (see e.g. Carbon Market Watch, 2011). As such, they are not
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driven solely by financial considerations, which make it unlikely that their
implementation depends on CER revenue.36
4.4 Time
Table 14 shows how, based on Specification 3a, the hazard of first issuance
has changed over time when project characteristics are controlled for. In
Specification 3a, time is split into three periods: Jan01-Dec07, Jan08-Dec09,
Jan10-Dec12. Arguably, the split is somewhat artificial, but it serves the
purpose of showing what the hazard was in the period that followed the request
by CMP 5 in December 2009 to streamline and speed up CDM procedures,
compared with the period that preceded it. The hypothesis is that the hazard
of first issuance is larger in Jan10-Dec12 than in Jan08-Dec09.
Table 14. Effect of time on the hazard of first issuance, based on Specification 3a








































Jan01-Dec07 17.23 0.00 2.00 0.33
continued
36An example of a group of such projects, according to Lazarus and Chandler (2011),
comprises high-efficiency coal power plants in China. Such plants may claim CERs if
the project developer can demonstrate that in the absence of the CDM, a less-efficient





















Jan11-Dec12 0.83 0.02 1.13 0.13
Notes: The dummy for the period that begins with Jan08 is excluded from the regression.
Thus, the hazard ratios of the remaining dummies are interpreted relative to that period.
The p-value shows the probability of the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is one, i.e.
that the hazard of first issuance is the same in the included and excluded periods.
Somewhat surprisingly, the estimates show that in Jan10-Dec12 the hazard
of first issuance was approximately only half what it was in Jan08-Dec09,
proving the hypothesis wrong. Given that the changes envisaged by CMP 5
were implemented gradually by the CDM EB during 2010, Table 14 shows how
the result changes if the split point between the second and third period is
moved 6 and 12 months forward in time. The conclusion remains unchanged,
with the hazard of first issuance being smaller in the third period than in the
second.
For comparison, Table 15 shows how the hazard of request for registration
has changed over time. Surprisingly, it shows that in Jan10-Dec12 the hazard
of request for registration was much higher than in Jan08-Dec09.
Table 15. Effect of time on the hazard of submitting a registration request, based
on Specification 3c.
Dummy for period
Duration d < 250 days Duration d ≥ 250 days
Hazard ratio p-value Hazard ratio p-value
Jan01-Dec07 5.71 0.00 2.00 0.00
Jan10-Dec12 2.37 0.00 1.20 0.00
Notes: The dummy for the period Jan08-Dec09 is excluded from the regression. Thus, the
hazard ratios of the remaining dummies are interpreted relative to the period Jan08-Dec09.
The p-value shows the probability of the null hypothesis that the hazard ratio is one, i.e.
that the hazard of requesting registration is the same in the included and excluded periods.
Summa summarum, when project characteristics are controlled for, the du-
ration between GSP start and request for registration has reduced over time,
whereas the duration between GSP start and first issuance has increased over
time. To the extent that these changes can be attributed to the streamlined
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CDM procedures, they show that the procedures have had a mixed success.
However, attributing the change solely to the streamlined CDM procedures
would be a gross overstatement. There are a plethora of omitted variables,
not least the CER price, which has also changed over time.
5 Conclusions
This article answers two questions. First, what is the distribution of the
time to market across all projects that started the Global Stakeholder Process
(GSP) in 2003-2012? Second, how does the time to market depend on host
country, the technology on which a project relies, the scale of the project, and
time?
The answer to the first questions shows that not only is the carbon market
littered with successful projects and Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs)
issued by them, it is further littered with failed projects, that is, projects that
either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or
projects that have been successfully registered but that fail to issue any CERs.
This conclusion is based on the finding that between GSP start and request for
registration 30% of all projects fail, while another 20% fail between request for
registration and first issuance. For an individual project, a failure means that
it will not be able to recuperate any of the costs due to the CDM, including
the cost of preparing the Project Design Document and the cost of validation.
A project may fail to issue CERs for a number of reasons. These may be
related to the CDM project cycle or the underlying project; e.g. a registered
project may fail to generate CERs because of a missing grid connection.
For the other 50% of all projects, the median time to market is four years. Is
four years a long time or not? It is definitely longer than what was expected
at the outset of the CDM. For example, the World Bank’s Carbon Finance
Unit put the time to market (as defined here) at 1.5-3.5 years (World Bank,
2003). The considerable delay in bringing CDM projects to market has created
a honey trap for project developers. The high initial prices for CERs lured
more and more projects to seek registration under the CDM, and, because of
the delay, the flow of projects gained momentum for years. As large volumes
entered the market, it became clear that there was not sufficient demand, and
the price for CERs dropped close to zero.
The answer to the second question shows that some of the best projects, in
terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market,
whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are
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those that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental
challenge for the CDM. The answer to this question also shows that, in contrast
to what has been reported previously, not all durations measured along the
CDM project cycle have increased over time.
A topic not covered by this article is how the hazard of first issuance of
certain project types, e.g. HFCs destruction projects, has changed over time.
This would make an interesting topic for future research. The methodology is
provided in this article.37





Ambrosi, P., & Kossoy, A. (2010). State and trends of the carbon market 2010.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Au Yong, H. W. (2009). Investment additionality in the CDM [Technical
Paper]. Edinburgh: Ecometrica Press.
Burniaux, J.-M., Chateau, J., Dellink, R., Duval, R., & Jamet, S. (2009).
The economics of climate change mitigation: How to build the necessary
global action in a cost-effective manner [OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, 701]. Paris: OECD. doi: 10.1787/224074334782
Cameron, C., & Trivedi, P. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and applica-
tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carbon Market Watch. (2011). Additionality: The trouble with large-scale
CDM projects [Newsletter #17]. Brussels: Carbon Market Watch.
CDM EB. (2009). Approved consolidated baseline and monitoring methodology
ACM0002 - Consolidated baseline methodology for grid-connected elec-
tricity generation from renewable sources, ACM0002 / Version 13.0.0,
Sectoral scope: 01, EB 67. Bonn: UNFCCC.
CDM EB. (2010). Annual report of the Executive Board of the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol [FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/10]. Bonn:
UNFCCC.
CDM EB. (2011). Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism
- Fifty-ninth meeting - Report version 01.1*, Date: 18 February 2011
[Ref: CDM-EB-59]. Bonn: UNFCCC.
Chen, K. (2012). CER supply to shrink as Chinese firms abandon U.N. carbon
market: analyst [Carbon Market News 18 April 2013 12:35]. Oslo: Point
Carbon.
COP. (2002). Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh ses-
sion, held at Marrakesh from 29 october to 10 november 2001, adden-
Publication II
81
dum, part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, volume II
[FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, 21 January 2002]. Bonn: United Nations.
Cormier, A., & Bellassen, V. (2013). The risks of CDM projects: How did only
30% of expected credits come through? Energy Policy , 54 (1), 173-188.
CPD. (2012). CDM Policy Dialogue Research Programme - Research Area:
Governance [CDM Policy Dialogue]. Bonn: CDM Policy Dialogue.
Giger, C. (2012). Additionality of Swiss-Chinese CDM projects [Master’s
thesis]. Bern: University of Bern.
Gillenwater, M., & Seres, S. (2011). The Clean Development Mechanism:
A review of the first international offset programme. Greenhouse Gas
Measurement and Management , 1 (3-4), 179–203. doi: 10.1080/20430779
.2011.647014
Grambsch, P., & Therneau, T. (1994). Proportional hazards tests and diag-
nostics based on weighted residuals. Biometrika, 81 (3), 515-526. doi:
10.1093/biomet/81.3.515
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C., Brack, D., & Forsyth, T. (1999). The Kyoto Proto-
col: A guide and assessment. London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs.
Haites, E., Duan, M., & Seres, S. (2006). Technology transfer by CDM
projects. Climate Policy , 6 (3), 327-344. doi: 10.1080/14693062.2006
.9685605
IETA. (2009). State of the CDM 2009: Reforming for the present and prepar-
ing for the future. Geneva: International Emissions Trading Association.
IETA. (2010). State of the CDM 2010: Focusing on efficiency. Geneva:
International Emissions Trading Association.
IGES. (2013). IGES CDM project database as of 1st February 2013. Hayama:
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies.
Jones, C., Brevik, A. K., & Melum, F. (2012). Oversupply in carbon credit
market could hit 1400 million credits by 2020 [Press release, 10 October
2012]. Oslo: Point Carbon.
Koakutsu, K., Okubo, N., Takahashi, K., Torii, N., & Fukui, A. (2011). CDM
reform 2011: Verification of the progress and the way forward. Hayama:
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies.
Lazarus, M., & Chandler, C. (2011). Coal power in the CDM: Issues and
options [Working Paper, 2011-02]. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment
Institute.
Michaelowa, A., Gagnon-Lebrun, F., Hayashi, D., Flores, L. S., Crete, P., &
Krey, M. (2007). Understanding CDM methodologies - A guidebook to
Publication II
82
CDM rules and procedures. London: Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Michaelowa, A., & Jotzo, F. (2005). Transaction costs, institutional rigidities
and the size of the Clean Development Mechanism. Energy policy , 33 (4),
511-523. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2003.08.016
Michaelowa, A., & Purohit, P. (2007). Additionality determination of Indian
CDM projects: Can Indian CDM project developers outwit the CDM Ex-
ecutive Board? [Climate Strategies Discussion Paper, CDM-1]. London:
Climate Strategies.
Michaelowa, A., Stronzik, M., Eckermann, F., & Hunt, A. (2003). Transaction
costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Climate Policy , 3 (3), 261-278. doi:
10.3763/cpol.2003.0332
Platonova-Oquab, A., Spors, F., Gadde, H., Godin, J., Oppermann, K., &
Ambrosi, M. B. (2012). CDM Reform: Improving the efficiency and
outreach of the Clean Development Mechanism through standardization.
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Schneider, L. R. (2009). Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: Practi-
cal experiences and lessons learned. Climate Policy , 9 (3), 242-254. doi:
10.3763/cpol.2008.0533
Schneider, L. R. (2011). Perverse incentives under the CDM: An evaluation
of HFC-23 destruction projects. Climate Policy , 11 (2), 851-864. doi:
10.3763/cpol.2010.0096
Streck, C. (2007). The governance of the Clean Development Mechanism: the
case for strength and stability. Environmental Liability , 15 (2), 91-100.
UNEP Risø. (2013). UNEP Risø CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database,
January 1st 2013. Roskilde: UNEP Risø Centre.
UNFCCC. (1998). Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change. Bonn: United Nations.
World Bank. (2003). Small scale CDM projects: An overview. Washington,
DC: World Bank, Carbon Finance Unit.
World Bank. (2010). 10 years of experience in carbon finance - Insights from
working with the Kyoto mechanisms. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zhang, J., & Wang, C. (2011). Co-benefits and additionality of the Clean
Development Mechanism: An empirical analysis. Journal of Environ-





In this appendix, the probability distribution of the time to market, in terms
of the survival function S(d), is estimated separately for a number of selected
subpopulations using the KM estimator. S(d) gives the probability that a
project has not issued any CERs as a function of duration d from GSP start.
The subpopulations are Chinese wind power (Figure 7), Chinese hydro power
(Figure 8), Chinese biomass energy (Figure 9) and Chinese HFCs destruction
projects (Figure 10). The subpopulations were chosen to illustrate the effect
of the size of the subpopulation (in terms of the number of projects that have
issued CERs) on the accuracy of the estimate of S(d). The estimates show,
as might be expected, that the accuracy of the estimate of S(d) deteriorates
as the size of the subpopulation decreases.
Differences among survival functions can also be tested using a log-rank test.
For the null hypothesis that Chinese hydro and wind power projects have the
same S(d), a log-rank test gives the probability p = 0.000. The testing is
done with the function survdiff in the package survival (version 2.37-4) in the
open-source software R (version 3.0.2, http://www.r-project.org/).






















Figure 7. Time to market of Chinese wind power projects, of which a total of 1603
had started the GSP and 455 had issued CERs by the end of 2012. The solid line
shows S(d), the probability that the project has not issued any CERs as a function


























Figure 8. Time to market of Chinese hydro power projects, of which a total of 1576
had started the GSP and 378 had issued CERs by the end of 2012.






















Figure 9. Time to market of Chinese biomass energy projects, of which a total of
191 had started the GSP and 22 had issued CERs by the end of 2012.






















Figure 10. Time to market of Chinese HFCs destruction projects, of which a total




This appendix presents the results of a test of the proportionality assumption
suggested by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) for Specification 1a, Specification
2a, and Specification 3a. The testing is done with function cox.zph in the
package survival (version 2.37-4) in the open-source software R (version 3.0.2).
Table 16 shows the results of the per-variable tests and a global chi-square
test. The resulted are shown in terms of the p-value of the null hypothesis
that the proportionality assumption holds. If the p-value is small, the propor-
tionality assumption is violated.
Table 16. Results of the test suggested by Grambsch and Therneau (1994).
Covariate Dummy
p-value
Specif. 1a Specif. 2a Specif. 3a
Host Hosts with < 25 iss 0.03 0.74 0.73
Brazil 0.00 0.02 0.19
Chile 0.02 0.86 0.74
India 0.00 0.02 0.19
Indonesia 0.62 0.87 0.81
Malaysia 0.76 0.87 0.89
Mexico 0.01 0.19 0.40
South Korea 0.85 0.97 0.68
Vietnam 0.45 0.73 0.65
Type Types with < 25 iss 0.05 0.47 0.60
Biomass energy 0.00 0.08 0.19
Coal bed/mine methane 0.56 0.79 0.73
EE industry 0.00 0.81 0.92
EE own generation 0.44 0.59 0.64
Fossil fuel switch 0.02 0.71 0.84
Landfill gas 0.59 0.77 0.53
Methane avoidance 0.57 0.25 0.43
N2O 0.99 0.78 0.81
Wind 0.10 0.96 0.85
Scale 50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.69 0.90 0.85




















m1:South Korea 0.87 0.63
m1:Vietnam 0.33 0.29
. . . and
project
type
m1:Types < 25 iss 0.68 0.62
m1:Biomass energy 0.20 0.31
m1:Coal bed/mine methane 0.82 0.79
m1:EE industry 0.63 0.76
m1:EE own generation 0.28 0.31
m1:Fossil fuel switch 0.76 0.71
m1:Landfill gas 0.34 0.25
m1:Methane avoidance 0.15 0.23
m1:N2O 0.35 0.39
m1:Wind 0.17 0.22
. . . and
size
m1:50-500 ktCO2e per yr 0.57 0.56
m1:> 500 ktCO2e per yr 0.67 0.74














Paradox of overlapping climate policy
instruments
Abstract
This paper illustrates a paradox in which overlapping climate policy instru-
ments have the unintended consequence of accelerating global warming. The
insight follows from a dynamic model, where a quota obligation for renewables
is introduced alongside a carbon budget. It is shown that the quota obligation
suppresses the carbon price, and induces a switch from low carbon intensity
fossil fuels to high carbon intensity fossil fuels in generation to supply de-
mand not met with renewables. These fuel switches front-load the schedule at
which the carbon budget is exhausted and released to the atmosphere. Front
loading the release schedule brings emissions forward in time and accelerates
global warming. The amount of front-loading depends on the calibration of
the model. With a calibration for the EU-28 power generation sector, at its
largest, the front-loading amounts to 5.5 GtCO2 in 2035, which is equal to 5-6
years’ worth of emissions from electricity generation in EU-28.
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of COP 21, the question of instrument choice is as topical as
ever, as the signatories of the Paris Agreement must decide how to transform
contributions into policies.1 The current policy paradigm to control global
1COP21 refers to the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held
in Paris. The agreement adopted at the conference is commonly refereed to as the
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warming is to rely on multiple instruments. The EU, among others, relies on
a combination of a cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gases (GHG), sub-
sidy schemes for the explicit promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) and
energy efficiency standards. The EU Emissions Trading Schemes (EU ETS)
covers approximately 42% of EU-28 emissions through a cap on emissions from
large stationary sources, electricity generation in particular, and emissions
from air traffic within the trading area (EEA, 2016).2 National and suprana-
tional schemes that rely on quota obligations, such as the Swedish-Norwegian
tradable green electricity certificate scheme, typically set an explicit target of
increasing generation or generation capital by a given date.3
This paper combines elements from the literature pioneered by Tinber-
gen (1952), on the relation between the number of policy instruments and
the number of policy targets, and the literature pioneered by Sinn (2008)
on the relation between climate policies and the temporal incentives to ex-
tract fossil fuel deposits. Recent work with close relevance is Böhringer and
Rosendahl (2010, 2011), which demonstrate that the introduction of a quota
obligation for renewables alongside a cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 promotes
power generation by the most polluting fossil fuels. Other recent work in-
clude Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2013) and Liski and Vehviläinen
(2015), which study the subsidised entry of wind power to the Nordic electric-
ity market, and Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb (2014) and Amigues, Le Kama, and
Moreaux (2015), which study the transition from non-renewable to renewable
energy sources.
A gap in the literature is how overlapping instruments interact in a dy-
namic set-up. To fill this gap, this paper studies how the a combination of a
carbon budget and a quota obligation drives de-carbonisation in a dynamic
set-up, which gives specific consideration to the time paths of the endogenous
variables.4 For comparison, Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb (2014) study how the
transition is driven by just a carbon budget, Amigues et al. (2015) how the
Paris Agreement.
2Excluding land use, land use changes and forestry (LULUCF), GHG emissions from
the EU-28 in 2014 were approximately 4.27 GtCO2e, of which 1.79 GtCO2e were
covered by the EU ETS. Emissions from electricity generation were approximately
1.05 GtCO2e (EEA, 2016; Eurostat, 2016).
3The Swedish-Norwegian tradable green electricity certificate scheme (TGC) has an
explicit target of increasing power generation from renewables by a total of 28.4 TWh
between 2012 and 2020 (Swedish Energy Agency, 2016).
4This paper studies policy instrument overlap, i.e. interaction of policies targeted
at the same sectors. The question of policies targeted at non-ETS sectors, such as
road transport that fall under the Effort Sharing Regulation in the EU, is an entirely
different albeit interesting question.
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transition is driven by a declining stock of the non-renewable resource. This
paper follows the practice of Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb (2014) and Amigues et
al. (2015) and assumes that generation is subject to capacity constraints and
convex adjustment costs.5 In this set-up, it is shown that a quota obligation
alongside a carbon budget is not just inefficient but may have the unintended
consequence of accelerating rather than decelerating global warming.6
The inefficiency is attributable to a reallocation of emissions, and conse-
quently abatement, within the carbon budget.7 With a calibration for the
EU-28 power generation sector, the quota obligation roughly doubles the costs
of complying with the carbon budget.8
The acceleration of global warming is attributable to a front-loading of the
exhaustion of the carbon budget. The introduction of a quota obligation sup-
presses the carbon price, induces a switch from low carbon intensity fossil fuels
to high carbon intensity fossil fuels in generation to supply residual demand,
defined as demand met by non-reneweables. As a consequence, the release of
carbon budget is brought forward in time. Front-loading the release of the
carbon budget leads to a higher level of cumulative CO2 and a larger global
temperature response.9 The amount of front-loading depends on the calibra-
tion of the model. It is shown that with a calibration for the EU-28 power
generation sector, at its largest, the front-loading amounts to 5.5 GtCO2 in
2035, which is equal to 5-6 years’ worth of emissions from electricity generation
in EU-28.
The result that a quota obligation may bring forward the release of carbon
budget resembles the Green Paradox, proposed by Sinn (2008). In both the
5Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb (2014) assume that initial generation capital has a carbon
intensity equal to the current average thermal production mix in the EU and show
that it is replaced by new gas fired generation in the mid-term and renewables in
the long-term.Amigues et al. (2015) assume that initially generation relies on oil and
show how oil is gradually replaced with a renewable resource.
6It is important to note that this result has no bearing on the desirability of quota
obligations as stand-alone instruments, the study of which is not part of this paper.
7Aggregate emissions are unchanged unless the quota obligation, as a stand-alone
instrument, is strict enough to push emissions below the carbon budget (Böhringer
& Rosendahl, 2011).
8If there are other market failures in addition to global warming, such as energy
security, the situation is different, see e.g. Fischer and Preonas (2010). In the model
of this paper there are no other market failures.
9The schedule at which the carbon budget is released determines the global tem-
perature response, albeit with a delay of 25-50 years. According to Hansen et al.
(2005), it takes 25-50 years for the Earth’s surface temperature to reach 60 percent




Green Paradox and the paradox identified in this paper, the introduction
of new policies accelerates global warming, albeit in this paper there is no
strategic behaviour by the owners of fossil deposits.10 Within the literature
pioneered by Sinn (2008), van der Ploeg andWithagen (2012, p. 358) show that
with convex production costs of the renewable backstop, a backstop subsidy
always accelerates the extraction of fossil fuel resources in regime where (i)
global warming externalities are not internalised, (ii) fossil fuel reserves are
fully exhausted in finite time, and (iii) in which there is an initial phase where
only fossil fuel is used. The result by van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012)
arises in a set-up where the first-best instrument, a CO2 tax is not feasible,
and governments resort to a second-best instrument, a renewable backstop
subsidy.11 In comparison, the paradox identified in this paper arises in a
set-up where the GHG externality is fully internalised, by the carbon budget.
The set-up of this paper is believed to reflect the current situation of the
EU where the perceived inability of the EU ETS to de-carbonise the economy
is used as argument for subsidising RES.12 The result that a quota obliga-
tion brings emissions forward in time may provide some explanation for the
Energiewende paradox. In Germany, aggregate emissions are increasing de-
spite power generation from renewables increasing both in relative as well as
absolute terms (Graichen & Redl, 2014).13
The model of this paper is an optimal control problem with the interception
of two targets. The first target is that RES generation must equal or exceed the
quota obligation by time t = T̂ , where T̂ is fixed and equal to 2030. T̂ = 2030
has been chosen to match the EU 2030 target.14 Starting from t = T , where
T is free, the economy is in steady state. The second target is that at T , RES
10The Green Paradox states that a gradual greening of economic policies exerts a
stronger downward pressure on future fossil fuel prices than current fossil fuel prices
and acts as an announced expropriation, which provokes deposit-owners to accelerate
extraction (Sinn, 2009).
11In the set-up of van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012, p. 358), the first-best instru-
ment is CO2 tax that increases at a rate equal to a Hotelling term minus a term that
depends on marginal global warming damages.
12RES subsidies typically fall into one of three categories: investment subsidies, feed-
in-tariffs and tradable green certificates (TGC).
13Between 2009 and 2013, emissions from German power supply has steadily increased
as a consequence of a switch from gas to lignite and gas to hard coal (Graichen &
Redl, 2014). The fuel switches have been driven by (i) an increase in the spread
between the gas price and the hard coal price, and (ii) a decrease in the carbon price.
14The EU has adopted a binding target of increasing the share of RES to at least
27% of EU energy consumption by 2030 through the policy framework for climate
and energy for 2020-2030 (European Commission, 2014).
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generation capital must be sufficient to supply all electricity.15 To to solve the
model, this paper relies on the rich literature that deals with multiple intercept
problems, specifically on Bryson and Ho (1975), Stengel (1994) and Chachuat
(2007). In comparison with current megamodels, e.g. those used to generate
the EU Reference Scenario 2016, the model of this paper is very simple.16 The
model of this paper is made as realistic as possible in its particular context
while allowing it to be solved analytically, to the extent of decomposing the
effect of a more ambitious quota obligation on emissions and cumulative CO2
released to the atmosphere.
For simplicity, in the model, it is assumed that there just one sector, one
quota, no end date for the carbon budget and no constraints on how big a
share of the budget may be exhausted in a given year. In comparison, the EU
ETS covers all stationary sources above a certain threshold, not just power
utilities. Also flights within the European Economic Area are included in the
EU ETS. Allowances for these sectors are either auctioned or allocated for free,
depending on whether a sector is perceived to be at risk of carbon leakage
or not.17 The EU ETS consists of a series of linked trading periods. The
current rules allow for unlimited banking. Borrowing within a trading period
is allowed. Borrowing is however constrained by the availability of future
vintages.18 The rules allow operators to use allowances from year y+1 to meet
compliance obligations in year y. Alternatively, operators can also borrow by
using part of the accumulated surplus.19 The Market Stability Reserve (MSR),
due to become operational in January 2019 will further facilitate borrowing,
and as a consequence move the EU ETS a step closer to the model of this
paper.20
15At at T , the carbon budget may or may not have been exhausted.
16For a description of the models used to generate the EU Reference Scenario 2016
see Capros et al. (2016).
17The power sector is free to trade emission allowances with other ETS sectors, but
not with the aviation sector. Airlines can buy allowances from stationary sources but
not vice versa.
18For each year, a yearly allocation is established. The free allowances are allocated
by the end of February, the rest is auctioned evenly throughout the year. Operators
surrender allowances once a year. Surrendering of allowances for a given year takes
place by end of April the following year (European Parliament and Council, 2003).
19By the end of 2015, the surplus was 1.83 GtCO2e, which is equal roughly to one
year’s worth of emissions from the EU ETS (Sandbag, 2016).
20The reserve will have an initial size equal to the back-loaded allowances from Phase
3 of the EU ETS (2013-2020). Allowances will be automatically released from the
reserve if the number of allowances in the market falls below a certain minimum
threshold (European Parliament and Council, 2015). Most importantly, the release is
not dependent on the price, only on the number of allowances in circulation.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The model is presented
in Section 2. Analytical and numerical results are derived in Sections 3 and
4, respectively. Section 5 concludes. The derivation of necessary conditions to
the social planner’s problem and longer proofs are given in the appendices.
2 Necessary conditions for the optimal control
Here, the model is presented and the necessary conditions for social planner’s
choice of the optimal control are derived. The social planner’s objective is to
minimise the total discounted cost C of supplying electricity by the choice of
the controls u(i, t) =
[
y(i, t) q(i, t)
]
, where y(i, t) is investments in genera-
tion capital, q(i, t) is generation, i is an index for technology and t is time.21




, where k(i, t) is
generation capital, which is technology specific and does not depreciate, and
b(t) is the remaining carbon budget at time t.22 Table 1 shows the interde-
pendencies between the control variables and the state variables.
Table 1. Interdependencies between the state and the control variables
Type Var. Description Interdependencies Initial value
State k(i, t) Generation capital k̇(RES, t) = y(i, t) k(RES, 0) = 0
State b(t) Carbon budget ḃ(t) = −∑i∈I ε(i)q(i, t) b(0) = Θ
Control y(i, t) Investment . .
Control q(i, t) Generation 0 ≤ q(i, t) ≤ k(i, t) .
For simplicity, it is assumed that demand for electricity is fixed and equal to
Ω. Electricity can be generated by combustion of GHG emitting fossil fuels or
by a renewable energy source (RES). The generation technologies are indexed
by i ∈ I = {1, ...,m,RES}.23 The set I is finite and ε(i) is strictly positive
for fossil fuels and zero for RES.24 The following properties of the model drive
de-carbonisation of power generation,
i generation from renewables has a zero cost of operation whereas fossil
fuels do not,
21The social planner only considers the costs of supplying electricity. Other compo-
nents of social welfare, such as social damages from GHG, are not included in the
cost function.
22u(i, t) and x(i, t) are column vectors.
23It is assumed that there are no pair of technologies (i, j) that have the same carbon
intensity, ε(i) = ε(j). This assumption is required for the analytical results.
24Lignite is more carbon intensive than hard coal. As a consequence, a kWh generated
by the combustion of lignite reduces the carbon budget more than a kWh generated
by the combustion of hard coal.
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ii a carbon budget of b, which has an initial size equal to to Θ, and
iii a quota obligation, which requires that electricity generated from RES
q(i, t), and consequently generation capital, k(i, t), where i = RES, is
equal or larger to a fixed target equal to Φ at t = T̂ .
Even without (ii) and (iii), all power generation will eventually be de-carbonised.
In the presence of (i)-(iii), the transition path is different than in the presence
of just (i). A situation where the carbon budget is not exhausted is perfectly
conceivable, as is the situation in which the carbon leads to more RES based
generation at t = T̂ than required by the quota obligation. The situation in
which the entire carbon budget is exhausted before T̂ is also perfectly con-
ceivable.25
The strategy of complying with the quota obligation is to solve for the op-
timal control in parts. First, the optimal control, and associated cost C1, is
solved for [0, T̂ ]. Second, the optimal control, and associated cost C2, is solved
for [T̂ , T ]. The total cost C is equal to the sum of C1 and C2. By this strategy,
the quota obligation can be be taken as a state inequality constraint over the
optimisation over the first period. The first period is linked to the second
period by the terminal cost, which is equal to future costs given an optimal
choice of the controls in the second period. At the end of the second period,
at t = T , the economy is in steady state. In the steady state, by necessity,
all power is supplied by renewables, investments in RES are zero, generation
with fossil fuels is zero and emissions are zero.26 Since the cost after T is zero,
the time after T is omitted from the optimisation.
2.1 Optimal control over the first period









2 , i ∈ I = {1, ...,m,RES}, (1)
25Whether or not the carbon budget will be exhausted by T or not depends on the
choice of parameter values. A generous carbon budget, a low cost of increasing RES
generation capacity and high costs of fossil fuels work in favour of leaving a part of
the carbon budget unused.
26In the limit t → ∞ it must be that k(RES, t) → Ω. If not not, the carbon budget
will be violated. In principle, with q(i, t) → 0 for i ∈ I \ RES, T could be infinite.
However, for simplicity, it is assumed that T is finite. While not modelled explicitly,
because of the lumpiness of capital, supplying very small amounts of fossil fuel based
electricity is not feasible.
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by the choice of the controls u(i, t) =
[
y(i, t) q(i, t)
]
∈ U , where U is the
control region, which takes the form of a hybercube, such that
y(i, t) ∈ [0, ȳ(i)], (2)
q(i, t) ∈ [0, k(i)], ∀i ∈ I, (3)
and ci(·) is a technology specific cost function, which is a function of the
controls only. The necessary conditions for the optimal control are derived for
a very general case of the cost function ci(·), for which the following hold true,
i fossil fuel fired generation capital is in abundance and does not depreci-
ate, which is equivalent to assuming that that generation capital can be
increased without cost, dci(u)/dy(i, t) = 0 for i ∈ I/RES,27
ii marginal investment costs in RES generation capital are positive and
strictly increasing, which reflects a competitive industry with increasing
marginal costs, dci(u)/dy(i, t) > 0 and d
2ci(u)/dy(i, t)
2 > 0 for i =
RES,
iii generation with fossil fuels has a strictly positive cost of operation,
dci(u)/dq(i, t) > 0 for i ∈ I/RES,
iv generation with RES has a zero cost of operation, dci(u)/dq(i, t) = 0 for
i = RES.
The minimisation of Eq. 1 must obey a number of constraints. First, the
equations of motion of the state variables,













Second, the initial values of the state variables,
k(i, 0) = k0(i) ≥ 0, i ∈ I \ RES, (7)
k(i, 0) = 0, i = RES, (8)
b(0) = Θ > 0. (9)
27Assuming otherwise, e.g. assuming an initial stock which must be maintained or




Third, the terminal constraints on the state variables,
ψ(T̂ ,x(i, T̂ )) = Φ− k(i, T̂ ) ≤ 0 , i = RES, (10)
κ(T̂ ,x(i, T̂ )) = −b(T̂ ) ≤ 0. (11)
which state that the quota obligation and the carbon budget, both of which are
treated as politically determined exogenous constraints, may not be violated.
Fourth, the complementary slackness conditions of the terminal constraints,
ξψ(T̂ ,x(i, T̂ )) = 0, ξ ≥ 0, i = RES, (12)
νκ(T̂ ,x(i, T̂ )) = 0, ν ≥ 0, (13)
from which it follows that that if the quota obligation of Eq. 10 is not binding,
that ξ = 0. Fifth, inequality constraints, each of which explicitly depend on
the controls,










≤ 0, ∀i ∈ I, (14)
where q(i, t)− k(i, t) ≤ 0 requires that generation may not exceed generation
capital and Ω−∑i∈I q(i, t) ≤ 0 that aggregate generation must equal or exceed
demand, which are physical requirements of the power system.
By adjoinment of the equations of motion by the adjoint variable λ(i, t)





ci(u(i, t)) + λ












(i, t) σȳ(i, t) σq
¯
(i, t) σq̄(i, t) σcap(i, t) σgen(t)
]T
. (17)
Table 2 gives an outline of the elements of the adjoint variable λ(i, t) and
the elements of the Lagrange multipler σ(i, t), both of which are expressed in
present-value terms, i.e. discounted to t = 0.
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λk(i, T̂ ) and λb(T̂ ) give the change in future costs at T̂ in response to a tiny
perturbation of respective state variable at T̂ (Chachuat, 2007, p. 124-125),
λk(i, T̂ ) =
∂C∗2
∂k(i, t)





It follows that λk(i, t) and λb(t) are both negative. λk(i, t) ≤ 0 because an
additional unit of RES generation capital reduces the need for investments
and as a consequence either has no effect or reduces costs. λb(t) ≤ 0 because
an increase of the carbon budget either has no effect or decreases costs.
It shown in Appendix A that the necessary conditions with respect to the
marginal value of generation capital read
λk(i, T̂
−) = λk(i, T̂+), i ∈ I \ RES, (20)
λk(i, T̂
−) = λk(i, T̂+)− ξ, i = RES, (21)
λk(i, t) + σy
¯
(i, t)− σȳ(i, t) = −e−rt ∂ci(u)
∂y(i, t)
, i ∈ I, (22)
σgen(t) + σq
¯
(i, t) = e−rt
∂ci(u)
∂q(i, t)
− ε(i)λb(t) + λ̇k(i, t), i ∈ I, (23)
where T̂− denotes the time just before T̂ and T̂+ just after T̂ . Eq. 20 states
that the marginal value of fossil fuel fired generation capital is continuous at
T̂ . Eq. 21 states that the marginal value of RES generation capital may be
discontinuous at T̂ if the quota obligation in Eq. 10 is binding, because if
the quota obligation is binding, ξ is either zero or strictly positive. Eq. 22
states that for an interior point solution for investments, the marginal value
of generation capital must equal investment costs, while Eq. 23 states that for
an interior point solution for generation, the marginal value of the generation
requirement, interpreted as the electricity price, must equal the sum of the
fuel cost, the carbon cost and the opportunity cost of capital.
Further, it is shown in Appendix A that the necessary conditions with respect
to the marginal value of the remaining carbon budget, λb(t), interpreted as
the carbon price, read
λ̇b(t) = 0, (24)
λb(T̂
−) = λb(T̂+)− ν. (25)
Eq. 24 and 25 state that the present value of the carbon price is constant,
except at T̂ , at which there may be a discontinuity, a increase in the carbon
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Table 2. Elements of λ(i, t) and σ(i, t).
Element Description Constraint Comp. slackness condition
λk(i, t) Change of
k(i, t) over time
k̇(i, t) = y(i, t) .
λb(t) Change of b(t)
over time
ḃ(t) = −∑i∈I ε(i)q(i, t) .
σy
¯
(i, t) ≥ 0 Boundary of
control region
−y(i, t) ≤ 0 σy
¯
(i, t)y(i, t) = 0
σȳ(i, t) ≥ 0 Boundary of
control region
y(i, t)− ȳ(i, t) ≤ 0 σȳ(i, t)(y(i, t)− ȳ(i, t)) = 0
σq
¯
(i, t) ≥ 0 Boundary of
control region
−q(i, t) ≤ 0 σq
¯
(i, t)q(i, t) = 0
σcap(i, t) ≥ 0 Capacity
constraint
q(i, t)− k(i, t) ≤ 0 σcap(i, t)(q(i, t)− k(i, t)) = 0
σgen(t) ≥ 0 Generation
requirement
Ω−∑i∈I q(i, t) ≤ 0 σgen(t)(Ω−
∑
i∈I q(i, t)) = 0
price.28 It follows from the complementary slackness condition of Eq. 13 that
if the carbon budget has not been exhausted by T̂ , that ν = 0, and that there
is no increase. If b(T̂ ) = 0, then ν ≥ 0, and there may or may not be a
increase.
2.2 Optimal over control the second period








i ∈ I = {1, ...,m,RES}
(26)
by choice of the controls u(i, t) =
[
y(i, t) q(i, t)
]
∈ U . There is no terminal
cost for the optimisation over the second period. T is endogenous. T is not
part of the control set, but is determined by the investments in RES generation
capital such that
k(RES, T ) =
∫ T
0
y(RES, t)dv = Ω, (27)
where Ω is the demand for electricity. The minimisation over the second period
is subject to the same equations of motion of the state variables and the same
28A increase in the carbon price represents a reduction in the level of ambition given
that λb(0) ≤ 0.
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inequality constraints as the minimisation over the first period, but subject to
different initial values of the state variables, which read
k(i, T̂+) = k(i, T̂−), i ∈ I, (28)
b(T̂+) = b(T̂−), (29)
and a different terminal constraint, which reads
η(T,x(i, T )) = −b(T ) ≤ 0, (30)
and a different complementary slackness condition of the terminal constraint,
which reads
γη(T,x(i, T )) = 0. (31)
It is shown in Appendix B that the necessary conditions for the optimal
control over the second period are the same as the necessary conditions for
the optimal control over the first period, except for the traversal conditions,
which read
λk(i, T
−) = 0, i ∈ I, (32)
λb(T
−) = −γ. (33)
Eq. 32 states that at the steady state, at T , the marginal value of generation
capital is zero for all technologies including RES. Eq. 33 states that the carbon
price is equal to −γ at T . It follows from Eq. 24 and Eq. 31 that if the carbon
budget has not been exhausted by T , i.e. b(T ) > 0, then γ = 0, and the
carbon price λb(t) is zero over both periods. If, however, the carbon budget is
exhausted by T , i.e. b(T ) = 0, then γ ≥ 0, and the carbon price may be zero
or negative.
3 Analytical results
Next, the analytical results are derived. The main analytical result is that
tightening the quota obligation unambiguously suppresses the carbon price
and postpones switches from high carbon intensity fuels to low carbon intensity
fuels in generation to supply residual demand. Residual demand is defined as
demand met by non-reneweables. For this section, the following restrictions
are adopted.
i Total investment costs are quadratic, which is analogous to assuming
that marginal investment costs are linear,
∂cRES(u(i, t))
∂y(RES, t)
= βy(RES, t). (34)
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iii ξ > 0, from which it follows that k(RES, T̂ ) = Φ by Eq. 12. The corner-
point equilibrium where ξ = 0 is non-interesting because in it the carbon
budget alone leads to a level of RES generation, which exceeds the quota
obligation.
iv b(T̂ ) > 0, from which it follows that ν = 0 by Eq. 13. By a similar
argument, the corner-point equilibrium where b(T̂ ) = 0 is non-interesting
because the steady state is reached before the requirement of the quota
obligation is to be met.
v b(T ) = 0, from which it follows that γ ≥ 0 by Eq. 31. The case where
b(T ) > 0 is non-interesting because it entails a zero carbon price over
the whole transition.
(i) and (ii) are restrictions on the cost function ci(u(i, t)), whereas (iii)-(v)
are restrictions that rule out non-interesting cases. The cost parameters α(i)
and β are independent of time. That α(i) is constant reflects the assump-
tion that the carbon budget covers only a small share of world emissions, and
consequently world fossil fuel consumption. This assumption reflects the EU
ETS. As a consequence of (ii), changes in the demand for fossil fuels within
the carbon budget has no effect on fuel prices.29 Another way to think about
the assumption that α(i) is constant is that fossil fuel fired generation is con-
strained by the size of the carbon budget but not by the size of fossil fuel
deposits.
Lemma 1 A quota obligation Φ cannot reduce the total discounted cost of
supplying electricity C. It can only increase it.
Proof The quota obligation is a constraint to the optimisation problem. Any
eligible control in the presence of the quota obligation can be attained in the
absence of the quota obligation.
Lemma 2 The marginal value of the carbon budget, interpreted as the carbon
price, follows Hotelling’s rule. In present value terms, i.e. discounted to t = 0,
the carbon price is constant.30
λb(t) = λb(0) (36)
29In 2015, the EU-28 accounted for 6.8 per cent of world consumption of coal and
11.5 per cent of world consumption of natural gas (BP, 2016).




Proof Eq. 24 states that the change of the present value of the carbon price
is zero.
Lemma 3 Investments in RES are increased up to the point where marginal
investment costs in RES equal the marginal value of RES capital,
∂cRES(u)
∂y(RES, t)
= −ertλk(RES, t), (37)
where ertλk(RES, t) is the marginal value of RES capital at t in current value
terms.
Proof Eq. 22 states that λk(i, t) + σy
¯
(i, t) − σȳ(i, t) = −e−rt∂ci(u)/∂y(i, t).
With a zero cost of operation for RES and a non-zero cost of operation for fossil
fuels, investments in RES are necessarily strictly positive over [0, T ], from
which it follows, by the complementary slackness condition, that σy
¯
(RES, t) =
0. It is assumed that the upper boundary ȳ(RES) is large enough as not to limit
the level of investments. Then, σȳ(RES, t) = 0. Substitution of σy
¯
(RES, t) = 0
and σȳ(RES, t) = 0 into Eq. 22 give Eq. 37.
Lemma 4 For all fossil fuel fired generation technologies, the marginal value
of increasing generation capital λk(i, t) is zero,
λk(i, t) = 0, ∀i ∈ I \ RES. (38)
Proof Substitution of dci(u)/dy(i, t) = 0 for i ∈ I \ RES into Eq. 22, gives
Eq. 38 for y(i, t) ∈ [0, ȳ(i)].
Lemma 5 If generation q(i, t) with technology i is strictly positive, the fol-
lowing must hold,
σgen(t) = e
−rtα(i)− ε(i)λb(0) + λ̇k(i, t). (39)
whereas if it is zero, the following must hold,
σgen(t) ≤ e−rtα(i)− ε(i)λb(0) + λ̇k(i, t), (40)
Proof Eq. 22 states that σgen(t) + σq
¯
(i, t) = e−rt∂ci(u)/∂q(i, t)− ε(i)λb(t) +
λ̇k(i, t). By substitution of ∂ci(u(i, t))/∂q(i, t) = α(i) from Eq. 35 and λb(t) =
λb(0) from Eq. 36, Eq. 23 reads
σgen(t) + σq
¯
(i, t) = e−rtα(i)− ε(i)λb(0) + λ̇k(i, t), (41)
where σq
¯
(i, t) ≥ 0. Eq. 39 and 40 follow from the complementary slackness
condition σq
¯
(i, t)q(i, t) = 0. If generation is strictly positive it holds that
σq
¯
(i, t) = 0.
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Eq. 39 states that the marginal cost of increasing generation, interpreted as
the electricity price, must be equal across all technologies with non-zero gen-
eration. The marginal cost of increasing generation is the sum of the fuel cost,
the carbon cost and the change in the marginal value of increasing generation
capital, all of which are expressed in present value terms, i.e. discounted to
t = 0.
Lemma 6 At every point over the transition, demand is met by RES and a
single fossil fuel. First, all available RES capital is used. Second, the remain-
der is met with the fossil fuel with the lowest cost of combustion.
Proof Eq. 40 states that generation is dispatched in order of increasing costs.
Because λk(i, t) = 0 for fossil fuels, the sum of the fuel cost and the carbon
cost alone determine which fossil fuel is combusted to meet residual demand.
Lemma 7 For every exogenous assignment of fossil fuel prices α(i), i ∈
I/RES, and endogenous carbon price λb(0), there is an ordered subset
S ≡ {1, ..., n} ⊂ I/RES, (42)
and a fuel switch schedule,31
Ŝ ≡ {t̂0, t̂1, ..., t̂n}, (43)
which shows what fossil fuels are used over the transition and in what order
to supply residual demand. For two consecutive elements in S, it must be that
ε(i) > ε(i+ 1) and that α(i+ 1) > α(i).
Proof A fuel i is in S if and only if it is the least fossil cost fuel, mini{e−rtα(i)−
ε(i)λb(0)} where i ∈ I RES at some t. For a high carbon intensity fuel to be
part of S it must be cheaper than the low carbon intensity fuel
Lemma 8 There is a one-to-one correspondence, a bijection, between the car-
bon price λb(0) and the fuel switch times t̂i. An increase of the carbon price
λb(0) < 0, i.e. a reduction in the level of ambition, is accompanied by a
postponement of t̂i.
Proof The carbon cost increases at the rate of interest. As a consequence,
high carbon intensity fuels lose their competitiveness quicker than low carbon
intensity fuels. At the time of a switch from one fossil fuel to another, from
31t̂i shows the time when the use of fuel i ends and the use of fuel i+1 begins. t̂0 < 0
shows the time when the combustion of fuel i = 1 begins. At t̂n ≡ T the use of the
least carbon intensive fossil fuels ends, after which all electricity is supplied by RES.
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fuel i to fuel i+1, which occurs at t̂i, the cost of combustion of fuel i and i+1
must be equal,
e−rt̂iα(i)− ε(i)λb(0) = e−rt̂iα(i+ 1)− ε(i+ 1)λb(0), (44)
which is equivalent to
−ert̂iλb(0) = α(i+ 1)− α(i)
ε(i)− ε(i+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (45)
Figure 1 illustrates the case of S = {1, 2, 3} for which it must hold, by
Lemma 7, that ε(1) > ε(2) > ε(3) and α(1) < α(2) < α(3). At t = 0, residual
demand is met by fuel i = 1, between t̂1 and t̂2 residual demand is met by
fuel i = 2. From t̂2 onwards residual demand is met by fuel i = 3. Lemma 8
shows that t̂i pins down the carbon price.
Figure 1. Change in the cost of combustion over time of three fossil fuels i ∈ S =
1, 2, 3.
It follows from Eq. 39 that over the transition, between t = 0 and t = T , the
change in the marginal value of a unit of RES capital must equal the cost of
generating one unit of output with the least cost fossil fuel,






The marginal value of RES capital between t = 0 and t = T̂ is found by














which is equivalent to











which reads by substitution of λk(RES, T̂
−) = λk(RES, T̂+)− ξ from Eq. 21,












By analogy, the marginal value of RES capital between t = T̂ and t = T is













which is equivalent to



















Lemma 9 The marginal value of RES capital at t ∈ [0, T ] can be written as
a sum of integrals over the fuel switch schedule Ŝ ≡ {t̂1, ..., t̂n}, where t̂n ≡ T ,




















ds ≥ 0, (54)
where π(t) is the discounted sum of the fuel cost and the carbon cost of the gen-
eration that an additional unit of RES capital at t replaces over the remaining
transition from t to T .
Proof With the help of an indicator function 1{t < T̂}, Eq. 49 and Eq. 52
can be written as Eq 53.
The Lagrange multiplier ξ in Eq. 53 be interpreted as an investment subsidy.
The investment subsidy accelerates investment in RES capital between t and
T̂ to satisfy the quota obligation Φ at T̂ . The present value of the investment
subsidy ξ is constant.
Proposition 1 A increase of the quota obligation Φ, increases the Lagrange
multiplier ξ, accelerates RES deployment over [0, T̂ ], increases the strictly neg-
ative carbon price λb(0) making it less ambitious, and postpones all fossil fuel
switches t̂i.
32




Proof See Appendix C.
Proposition 1 states that tightening the quota obligation Φ has two opposite
sign effects on the rate at which the carbon budget is exhausted and released
to the atmosphere. These effect are illustrated in Figure 2. The first effect
reduces the rate of exhaustion and is attributable to the accelerated deploy-
ment of RES over [0, T̂ ] and the consequent reduction in residual demand.
The second effect increases the rate of exhaustion and is attributable to the
postponement of fuel switches from low carbon intensity fuels to high carbon
intensity fuels in generation to supply residual demand. The first effect is grad-
ual as a result quadratic investment costs. The second effect is instantaneous
as result of an abundant supply of fossil fuel fired generation capital.
Figure 2. Effects of tightening the quota obligation
Proposition 2 The net effect of tightening the quota obligation Φ on cumu-






















where m = max(j|t̂j < t) is the fuel that is used to meet residual demand at
t. All fuel switches up to and including t̂m take place before t. The first set
of terms represent the effect attributable to the reduction in residual demand
and the second set of terms the effect attributable to the postponement of fuel
switches.
Proof See Appendix C.
The relative magnitude of the two opposite sign effects determine how the
path of exhaustion is affected by a more ambitious quota obligation. By
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assumption, the carbon budget will eventually be depleted.33 Front-loading
the release schedule accelerates global warming, while back-loading the release
schedule decelerates global warming.
4 Numerical results
Next, to quantify the two opposite-sign effects identified in the previous sec-
tion, a numerical minimisation of the total discounted cost of supplying elec-
tricity is performed with a choice of parameter values that reflect the EU-28
power generation sector. Table 3 shows the parametrisation.
The optimisation is done for two scenarios. The climate policy of Scenario 1
relies on the carbon budget only. The climate policy of Scenario 2 relies on the
combination of a carbon budget and a quota obligation. Scenario 1 represents
the counterfactual, that of relying solely on the EU ETS, while Scenario 2
represents the current situation in the EU of relying on a combination of
instruments. In Scenario 2, the level of RES investments over [0, T̂ ] are higher,
the carbon price is less ambitious, i.e. higher, and the switch from lignite to
hard coal and from hard coal to gas in generation to supply residual demand
occurs later than in Scenario 1. The release of the carbon budget in Scenario
2 is more front-loaded than in Scenario 1. The cumulative level of CO2 in
Scenario 2 is higher and as a consequence the average global temperature
response is larger in Scenario 2.
4.1 Power supply in EU-28
Table 4 shows the split of electricity generation in EU-28 across generation
technologies. It shows three things. First, generation with GHG emitting fuels
have been relatively stable between 1990-2014. Generation with GHG emitting
fuels in 2014 is taken to represent initial residual demand. Second, the current
fuel mix in this category is dominated by three fuels, lignite, other bituminous
coal and natural gas. Other bituminous coal is taken to be representative
of the aggregate hard coal. Jointly these three fuels account for more than
90% of generation with GHG emitting fuels. To simplify the analysis, while
preserving a maximum amount of realism, it assumed that there are three
GHG emitting fuels, lignite, hard coal, and natural gas, and one representative
RES technology. Third, after exclusion of hydro, the increase in generation
from RES over 1990-2014 can almost entirely be attributed to wind, solar and
33Non-depletion of the carbon budget would entail a zero carbon price
Publication III
109
Table 3. Choice of parameters for the numerical optimisation problem.
Parameter Value Source
Discount rate r = 0.05 .
CO2 emission factors in
gCO2/kWh
1035 for lignite, 875 for hard
coal (other bitminous coal),
400 for natural gas
Implied carbon emission
factors from electricity gen-
eration from IEA (2015,
p. 35)
Demand for electricity 1383 TWh/a Equal to EU-28 generation
from CO2 emitting sources
from Eurostat (2016)
Initial level of emissions
from electricity generation
1.05 GtCO2/a (in 2014) Generation from Eurostat
(2016), emission factors
from IEA (2015, p. 35)
Size of the carbon budget 23 GtCO2, assuming a lin-
ear reduction from the ini-
tial level in 2014 of 1.74
pp/a between 2015-2020
and 2.2 pp/a from 2021 on-
wards
Linear reduction factors for
2015-2030 as per the pro-
posal of the European Com-
mission (2015) to revise the
EU ETS
Size of the quota obligation Requirement is to increase
generation from RES by 800
TWh/a between 2015 and
2030
Based on the projection by
Held et al. (2014)
Cost parameter β See Table 5 See Table 5
Fossil fuel cost in EUR per
generated MWh
13.57 of lignite, 20 of hard
coal, 47 of natural gas
VGB (2015), the cost of lig-
nite includes only the vari-
able cost
biofuels.34
The cost parameter β, which determines the rate at which marginal invest-
ment costs of RES increase as function of investment is calibrated by compar-
ing unit capital cost for 2012 from IEA (2014b) with the deployment statistics
from EWEA (2013) and EPIA (2013). The comparison is done for wind and
solar photovoltaics (PV). Biofuels are excluded because the model assumes
that RES has no fuel costs. The calibration is done by asking the question
what value of β generates the observed capital costs for 2012 given the de-
ployment realisation of 2012. Table 5 shows the estimated value β for onshore
wind, offshore wind, rooftop PV and utility-scale PV. Rooftop PV is chosen
34Hydro power is excluded because the availability of hydro power is precipitation






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as the representative RES technology because it has a lower β than offshore
wind and utility-scale PV. Onshore wind is excluded because of the natural
limitations to significant further expansion of its use in Europe.











1.79 5.18 3.25 2.49
Load factor adjusted capital costb MEUR
MW
6.3 10.6 21.1 14.9
Load factor adjusted capital costb MEUR
TWh/a
723 1211 2405 1701
Capacity deploymentc MW 10729 1166 11954 4718




20.7 3.9 12.6 5.4




34.9 311.9 191.4 316.6
a IEA (2014b) model assumption of capital costs in Europe in 2012.
b Adjusted with estimates of load factors in 2012 in Europe from IEA (2014b), e.g. 0.22 for
onshore wind has. The load factor states the ratio of actual output to rated output.
c Wind deployment figures from EWEA (2013), solar from EPIA (2013).
d Calculated based on Eq. 34 as the ratio between load factor adjusted capital cost and load
factor adjusted capacity deployment.
4.2 The carbon budget and the quota obligation
The size of the carbon budget is set by assuming a linear reduction factor of
of 1.74 pp/a between 2015-2020, 2.2 pp/a between 2021-2030, and 2.2 pp/a
from 2031 onwards. The linear reduction factors for 2015-2030 are as per the
proposal of the European Commission to revise the EU ETS and are expressed
relative to the quantity of allowances issued in 2010 (European Commission,
2015).
The size of the quota obligation is set to require a 800 TWh/a increase in
RES generation between 2015 and 2030, based on Held et al. (2014). According
to Held et al. (2014), to meet the EU 2020 target electricity generation from
RES must increase by 500 TWh/a between 2010-2020 in net terms and by
an additional additional 350-650 TWh/a between 2020-2030 in net terms, to
meet the EU 2030 target. The variance of the latter is attributable to different
assumption of the improvement in energy efficiency.35
A quota obligation of 800 TWh/a is compatible with the revised Renewable
Energy Directive, released by the European Commission as part of the Winter
35For comparison, over the same periods, total energy generation from RES, includ-
ing heat, cooling and transport, must increase by 1,000 TWh/a and by 1,300-1,700,
respectively. Held et al. (2014) assume a least-cost allocation between sectors.
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Package (European Commission, 2016). A central objective of the directive is
that by 2030 half of European electricity should be from RES. This is equiva-
lent to a quota obligation of 665 TWh/a for 2030 (cf. last column of Table 4).
While the decision of how to promote RES is left to each Member States, the
Directive lays down general principles that Member States should follow in
designing support schemes for RES.
4.3 Scenario 2 compared with Scenario 1
Figure 3a shows that the quota obligation of Scenario 2 accelerates RES de-
ployment between 2015 and 2030. Figure 3b shows that residual demand is
reduced along the whole transition in Scenario 2 as a consequence. With more
RES capital there is less demand for fossil fuel fired generation.
Figure 4a and 4b show the undiscounted investment and fuel costs in trillion
EUR (TEUR) per year. The total cost is the sum of the investment costs and
fuels costs. For Scenario 1, the total cost is the sum of the areas under the
dotted lines. For Scenario 2, the total cost is the sum of the areas under the
solid lines. The discounted total cost of Scenario 2 is roughly double that of
Scenario 1.
Figure 5a and 5b show that the quota obligation of Scenario 2 suppresses the
carbon price. The carbon price is negative because the model is set up as a
cost minimisation problem. The quota obligation suppresses the carbon price
from minus EUR 47 to minus EUR 21 per tCO2 in present value terms. Eq. 45
states that at the time of a fuel switch, the value of the CO2 reduction must
equal the increase in fuel cost. It follows that at the time of a switch from hard
coal to natural gas, the carbon price must be EUR 56.8.36 In Scenario 1 this
switch occurs in 2018, in Scenario 3 the switch takes place in 2035. Discounted
to 2015, the increase in fuel cost equals approximately EUR 47 in Scenario 1
and EUR 21 in Scenario 2, which matches the carbon prices generated by the
numerical optimisation.
Why does not the carbon price of Scenario 2 match the price of future
contracts for EU Emissions Allowances (EUA)? In December 2016, EUA future
contracts were traded for EUR 5 to EUR 7 depending on the year. The
main fundamental for the current price is the accumulated surplus of EUAs
and the market’s disbelief about the measures suggested by the European
Commission to address it. The model of this paper does not factor in the
36Based on the CO2 emission factors and fuels costs in Table 3 switching from hard
coal to natural gas reduces CO2 by 0.475 tCO2 per MWh and increases fuel costs by




Figure 6a and 6b show, in line with Proposition 1, that a suppression of the
carbon price postpones the switch from lignite to hard coal and from hard
coal to natural gas. In Scenario 1, the carbon price is too ambitious for lignite
to be competitive against hard coal and natural gas at any point over the
transition. In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 the carbon budget is exhausted.
The carbon budget is equal to the hatched areas in Figure 6a and 6b weighted
by the carbon intensities of each fuel.
Figure 7a and 7b show that the cumulative level of CO2 released to the
atmosphere is higher in Scenario 2 compared with Scenario 1. Figure 7b
shows the net effect of the quota obligation on the cumulative CO2 released
to the atmosphere by time t. It is a quantification of Proposition 2. It shows
that the net effect is a front-loading of the release schedule. At its largest, in
2035, the front-loading amounts to approximately 5.5 GtCO2, which is equal
to 5-6 years’ worth of emissions from electricity generation from EU-28 (with
the level of emissions in 2014).
Scenario 1 Scenario 2






(a) Investments in RES capital in (TWh/a)/a





(b) Residual demand in TWh/a
Figure 3. (a) shows RES deployment, (b) shows residual demand.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2






Undiscounted investment costs in TEUR/a






Undiscounted fuel costs in TEUR/a




Scenario 1 Scenario 2





(b) CO2 price in current value terms in EUR/tCO2 







(a) CO2 price in present value terms in EUR/tCO2
Figure 5. (a) shows the carbon price in current value terms, (2) shows the same in
present value terms (discounted to 2015).





(a) Generation in Scenario 1 in TWh/a





(b) Generation in Scenario 2 in TWh/a
Lignite fired generation Hard coal fired generation Gas fired generation
Figure 6. (a) shows generation in Scenario 1 in TWh/a with GHG emitting fuels
for supplying residual demand, (b) shows the same in Scenario 2.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2







(b) Cumulative release of CO2 in GtCO2








(b) Cum. rel. of CO2 in Scen. 2 relative to Scen. 1
Figure 7. (a) shows cumulative release of CO2 to the atmosphere in GtCO2 in
Scenario 1 and in Scenario 2, (b) shows cumulative release of CO2 in Scenario 2
relative to Scenario 1 in GtCO2.
5 Conclusions
Previous research has established that the introduction of a quota obligation
alongside a carbon budget increases the costs of compliance as a consequence
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of reallocation of abatement within the carbon budget. This paper illustrates
the existence of a mechanism through which the quota obligation not only
increases costs but may in addition accelerate rather than decelerate global
warming. The dynamic model of this paper provides this new insight. Static
models cannot predict the schedule at which the carbon budget is exhausted
and released to the atmosphere.
It is shown that a quota obligation accelerates the deployment of RES, sup-
presses the carbon price, and postpones the fuel switches to less carbon in-
tensive fuels in generation to meet residual demand. However, as the quota
obligation simultaneously reduces residual demand, the net effect of a quota
obligation can either be an acceleration or a deceleration of global warming.
Calibration of the model for the EU-28 power generation sector shows an
acceleration of global warming.
The paper has three contributions to the topical discussion of diluting cap-
and-trade schemes for CO2. First, the instrument overlap accelerates the de-
ployment of RES, and by doing so, it suppresses the carbon price. A cap-and-
trade scheme for CO2 promotes RES in power generation by a pass-through of
the carbon price into the electricity price. A higher price of electricity benefits
RES producers. By suppressing the carbon price, the quota obligation dilutes
this effect and creates a need for further policy intervention, which is likely
to further suppress the carbon price. This observation is supported by CERA
(2011), which show that achieving the 20 percent energy efficiency target as
well as the 20 percent renewables target of the EU’s 2020 climate and en-
ergy package will deliver CO2 emission reductions in excess of the abatement
required under the cap for Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the EU ETS.
Second, it demonstrates a process by which coal fired generation may take
precedence over gas fired generation. This may provide some explanation
for the Energiewende paradox, reported by Graichen and Redl (2014). The
paradox is that in Germany emissions are increasing despite RES based power
generation increasing both in relative as well as absolute terms. The reason
for the emissions increase is a switch from gas to lignite and gas to hard
coal. Germany is not the only country that has recently experienced a coal
renaissance IEA (2014a).
Third, it illustrates a paradox. The paradox is that relying on multiple
instruments not only increases costs but has the potential to accelerate global
warming, as a consequence of front-loading emissions. Scenarios that keep
global warming either within the 1.5 degree target or the 2.0 degree target
of the Paris agreement call for very significant early reduction by the power
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Appendix A: Necessary conditions for optimal control over the first
period




ci(u(i, t)) + λ
Tf(t,u) + σTg(t,x,u), (56)
The quadruple (x∗,u∗,λ∗,σ∗) over [0, T̂ ] must satisfy the following equations
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Rearranging, Eq. 58 and 59 read
λ̇b(t) = 0, (60)
λk(i, t) + σy
¯





(i, t) = e−rt
∂ci(u)
∂q(i, t)
− ε(i)λb(t) + λ̇k(i, t), (62)
for all generation technologies i ∈ I = {1, ..., n,RES}.




































Γ = C∗2 + ξψ(T̂ ,x) + νκ(T̂ ,x), (66)
and C∗2 is the terminal cost over the optimisation over the first period.
37T̂− denotes the time just before T̂ and T̂+ denotes the time just after T̂ .
Publication III
122
Appendix B: Necessary conditions for optimal control over the
second period
By analogy with the first period, the Lagrangian for the optimal control over




ci(u(i, t)) + λ
Tf(t,u) + σTg(t,x,u). (67)





















Γ = γη(T,x)) = γη(T,x)). (71)
Eq. 71 has no terminal cost because the terminal cost is zero over the optimi-
sation over the second period.
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Appendix C: Direct and indirect effects of a change of the quota
obligation
In this appendix it is shown that dλb(t)/dΦ > 0 and that dξ/dΦ > 0.
The quota obligation and RES investments over [0, T̂ ]
At T̂ , RES capital k(RES, T̂ ) must equal the quota obligation Φ. By substitu-
tion of ∂cRES(u(i, t))/∂y(RES, t) = βy(RES, t) from Eq. 34 and λk(RES, t) =




ert{π(t) + 1{t < T̂}ξ}. (72)
The accumulated stock of RES generation capital at T̂ is given by the integral
of y(RES, t) over [0, T̂ ] and must equal Φ,





erv {π(v) + ξ} dv = Φ, (73)
















dv = 1, (74)















at all 0 < v < T̂ , i.e. it is assumed that increasing the quota accelerates
investments in RES throughout [0, T̂ ]. That it would decelerate investments
at any point along [0, T̂ ] is thus ruled out.
The steady state and RES investments over [T̂ , T ]
Per definition, at T , RES generation capital is equal to the total demand for
electricity Ω. The stock of RES generation capital at T is given by the integral
of y(t) over [0, T ],






































dv = 0, (77)
Publication III
124








dv = −1, (78)










for all T̂ < v < T , i.e. it is assumed that increasing the quota decelerates
investments in RES throughout [T̂ , T ]. That it would accelerate investments









dv < −1 (80)
for all T̂ < v < T .
The carbon budget and the price of CO2
At T , the cumulative amount of CO2 released to the atmosphere must equal
the size of the carbon budget Θ. For the subsequent analysis, the following
notation is adapted. At T̂ residual demand is met by generation technology
m, which has a carbon intensity of ε(m). Thus, fuel switches from i− 1 to i,



















































































































































(ε(1)− ε(i+ 1))(Ω− k(RES, t̂i))dt̂i
dΦ
. (87)






















































erv{π(v) + 1{v < T̂}ξ}, dv. (89)




















dv < −1 (91)
for all T̂ < t < T . Lemma 8 states that there is bijection between the carbon
price and the fossil fuel switch times t̂i. As a consequence, dt̂i/dΦ must have
the same sign for all t̂i, and this sign must be positive for Eq. 88 to equal zero.




> 0, ∀i ∈ S, (92)






The cost saving and size of the investment subsidy
Eq. 54 states that discounted sum of fuel and CO2 costs of the generation that
an additional unit of RES capital at t replaces over the remaining transition






















ε(i)ds < 0, (95)



















dv = 1, (97)















dv = 1 (98)
where dλb(0)/dΦ > 0 by Eq. 93 and dπ(v)/dλb(0) < 0 by Eq. 95. As a
consequence, the term dξ/dΦ must be be strictly positive.
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